The annual Lancaster Philosophy of Psychiatry Work in Progress day was held on the 29th of June 2022. It was mostly in person except for one talk from Poland and one from Argentina. Here is a short summary of each talk.
JP Grodniewicz – Self Prejudice
JP outlined how the cognitive model in clinical psychology employs the notion of maladaptive cognition. JP aims to improve upon this concept. JP argued at least some maladaptive cognitions are better seen as self-prejudices. To make this argument JP considered the ways in which prejudices involve generalisations, and how self prejudices relate to beliefs and awareness.
Rachel Cooper – The concept of disorder: the problem with revisionist account
Rachel gave a historical account of the reaction to Boorse’s 1977 paper and then considered why the same questions are still being asked. Rachel outlined how notions of disorders are contested and shift over time, meaning that what is a counter example in one time period might not be a counter example later on. Finally, Rachel assessed the revisionist project.
Juliana Hoyos Garcia – Epistemic Injustice in Psychiatry, an Analysis with Gender Perspective
Juliana considered how epistemic injustice related to gender. Juliana outlined how autism is primarily considered to be male and borderline personalty disorder is primarily considered to be female and then related this to epistemic injustice. Juliana then outlined her plans to engage with people diagnosed with autism or borderline personality disorder to see what epistemic injustices they face.
Sam Fellowes – The importance of considering service users with different diagnoses in participatory research
I argued that there is good reason to include diagnosed individuals in discussions over modifying the diagnostic criteria of psychiatric diagnoses. However, I outlined how modifying the diagnostic criteria of one diagnoses can have implications for individuals who had other diagnoses, relating this issue to autism and schizoid personality disorder, and to autism and ADHD. I suggested that we need also include people with diagnoses other than autism when considering modifying the diagnostic criteria for autism.
Sophie Osiecki – Big Data and Psychiatry
Sophie outlined deep learning whereby computers learn without instructions. Sophie then considered how this might be used for diagnosing depression. Sophie outlined the problem of knowing how deep learning might relate to natural kinds and how deep learning might develop new classificatory schemes. Sophie argued that how much of this depends upon what the ultimate aim of psychiatric knowledge is.
Jodie Russel – The hermeneutics of illness: interpretation, normativity and mental disorder
Jodie spoke about mindshaping whereby how we interpret ourselves shapes how we meaningfully interact with the environment. Jodie outlined how the folk psychological tools which come from the social sphere can constrain us. Jodie then discussed how psychiatric diagnoses can open up opportunities for interacting with the world but can also constrain us due to stigma.
Richard Hassall – The Social Ontology of Medical and Psychiatric Diagnoses
Richard portrayed diagnoses as speech acts by drawing upon Austin and as institutional facts through drawing upon Searle. Richard considered illocutionary speech acts whereby it exerts force upon a patient. Richard then expanded upon this by considering institutional facts which only exist within human institutions and then portrayed psychiatric diagnoses as being institutional facts, showing in what way they have institutional elements.
Dieneke Hubbeling – Disease Concept, the role of empirical data
Dieneke outlined an empirical study into stigma and diagnoses, looking at the views of medical students. In this study Dieneke found that most thought diseases had underlying biological mechanisms. Dieneke then discussed separate work about under which conditions vagueness over the boundaries of illness is a problem. Dienke considered whether this is a problem in the case of individuals and the case of societies.
Asiha Qadoos – Anger as a Moral Reactive Attitude to Interpersonal Trauma
Asiha argued that anger should be seen as a reactive attitude, countering Strawson’s claims. Asiha considered the relationship between anger, blame and responsibility, then considered under what conditions anger is justified, and then considered under what conditions anger is justified in cases of interpersonal trauma. Asiha outlined how anger can help us heal and how it can help restore agency, and then considered whether this was true in relation to blame.
Frederico Burdman – Addiction as a Partial Excuse for Morally Wrongful Behavior
Federico considered how addiction related to moral responsibility. Federico outlined how mental illnesses are typically seen as conditions which reduce blameworthiness. Federico related this to the act of becoming an addict and actually being an addict. Fererico outlined how people can get addicted for multiple reasons, considered how each related to blameworthiness, and outlined how it can be difficult to know the consequences of your actions.
Hane Maung – Psychiatry and Neurology: Saving the Distinction
Hane aimed to defend the distinction between psychiatry and neurology. Hane outlined how they relate to different kinds of kinds, considering the differences in the projectable properties of psychiatric and neurological kinds. Hane then outlined how they differed in relation to norms, outlining how there are many norms which are present in psychiatry which are not present in neurology, such as those relating to intentionality and interpersonality.
The philosophy of psychiatry work in progress usually takes place every year between May and July. The call for papers is usual announced on places like the philos-l mailing list and twitter, as well as here.