

3rd Lancaster Game Theory Conference (LGTC2017)
17th – 18th November 2017: Lancaster University Management School (LUMS)

Programme

Day 1: Friday 17th November 2017

Venue: Lancaster House Hotel Conference Centre (Room: Training Room 1)

11:00 – 11:30 Registration and Welcome

11:30 – 12:15 **Plenary Talk 1 (Chair: Alexander Matros)**

Martin Pesendorfer (London School of Economics)

Monopoly pricing with reference dependent willingness to pay

12:15 – 14:00 **Lunch + Poster Session 1**

Marco Serena (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)

Level-k reasoning in reciprocal beliefs

Iain Embrey (Lancaster University)

A generalised theory of decision making; illustrated by application to human capital development

Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar (Lancaster University)

Public good provision, sanctions and corruption

14:00 – 15:30 **Regular Session 1 (Chair: Aurelie Slechten)**

Chris Wallace (University of Manchester)

Information acquisition and use by networked players

Sinem Hidir (University of Warwick)

Information acquisition and credibility

Ludovic Renou (Queen Mary University of London)

Information design in multi-stage games

15:30 – 16:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

16:00 – 17:30 **Regular Session 2 (Chair: Orestis Troumpounis)**

Toomas Hinnosaar (Collegio Carlo Alberto)

Dynamic common-value contests

David Rietzke (Lancaster University)

Robust comparative statics in contests

Martin K. Jensen (University of Leicester)

Limited rationality and macroeconomic theory

17:30 – 18:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

18:00 – 18:45 **Plenary Talk 2 (Chair: Alexander Matros)**

Philippe Jehiel (Paris School of Economics and University College London)

Investigation with forgetful liars

18:45 **Departure for conference dinner (LH Hotel)**

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Day 2: Saturday 18th November 2017
Venue: Lecture Theatre 1 (LT1), LUMS Building

09:30 – 10:30 **Regular Session 3 (Chair: Robert Rothschild)**

Anna Bogomolnaia (University of Glasgow)
Fair mixtures of public outcomes

Indrajit Ray (Cardiff University)
Any outcome is an interior equilibrium in a market

10:30 – 11:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

11:00 – 12:30 **Regular Session 4 (Chair: Konstantinos Georgalos)**

Kirill Pogorelskiy (University of Warwick)
News sharing and voting on social networks: an experimental study

Tatiana Mayskaya (Higher School of Economics)
Implications of overconfidence on information investment

Kaustav Das (University of Exeter)
Strategic experimentation with competition and private arrival of information

12:30 – 14:15 **Lunch + Poster Session 2**

Ludmila Matyskova (CERGE-EI, Charles University)
Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

Konstantinos Protopappas (Lancaster University)
Competing for advantage: a two-stage contest

Nina Bobkova (Bonn Graduate School of Economics)
Knowing what matters for others: information choice in auctions

14:15 – 15:45 **Regular Session 5 (Chair: Sonali SenGupta)**

Andriy Zapechelnyuk (University of St. Andrews)
A delegation approach to persuasion

Ryan Kendall (University College London)
Decomposing models of bounded rationality

Maria Kozlovskaia (Aston University)
Signalling expertise in markets for credence goods

15:45 – 16:15 Break (Coffee and Tea)

16:15 – 17:00 Plenary Talk 3 (Chair: Alexander Matros)

Peter Hammond (University of Warwick and Stanford University)
Statistical equilibrium for large games of incomplete information

17:00 **Farewell**