

**3<sup>rd</sup> Lancaster Game Theory Conference (LGTC2017)**  
**17<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> November 2017: Lancaster University Management School (LUMS)**

**Programme**

Day 1: Friday 17<sup>th</sup> November 2017

Venue: Lancaster House Hotel Conference Centre (Room: Training Room 1)

11:00 – 11:30 Registration and Welcome

11:30 – 12:15 **Plenary Talk 1 (Chair: Alexander Matros)**

[Martin Pesendorfer](#) (London School of Economics)  
*Monopoly pricing with reference dependent willingness to pay*

12:15 – 14:00 **Lunch + Poster Session 1**

[Marco Serena](#) (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)  
*Level-k reasoning in reciprocal beliefs*

[Jain Embrey](#) (Lancaster University)  
*A generalised theory of decision making; illustrated by application to human capital development*

[Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar](#) (Lancaster University)  
*Public good provision, sanctions and corruption*

14:00 – 15:30 **Regular Session 1 (Chair: Aurelie Slechten)**

[Chris Wallace](#) (University of Manchester)  
*Information acquisition and use by networked players*

[Sinem Hidir](#) (University of Warwick)  
*Information acquisition and credibility*

[Ludovic Renou](#) (Queen Mary University of London)  
*Information design in multi-stage games*

15:30 – 16:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

16:00 – 17:30 **Regular Session 2 (Chair: Orestis Troumpounis)**

[Toomas Hinnoaar](#) (Collegio Carlo Alberto)  
*Dynamic common-value contests*

[David Rietzke](#) (Lancaster University)  
*Robust comparative statics in contests*

[Martin K. Jensen](#) (University of Leicester)  
*Limited rationality and macroeconomic theory*

17:30 – 18:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

18:00 – 18:45 **Plenary Talk 2 (Chair: Alexander Matros)**

[Philippe Jehiel](#) (Paris School of Economics and University College London)  
*Investigation with forgetful liars*

18:45 **Departure for conference dinner (LH Hotel)**

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Day 2: Saturday 18<sup>th</sup> November 2017  
Venue: Lecture Theatre 1 (LT1), LUMS Building

09:30 – 10:30 **Regular Session 3 (Chair: Robert Rothschild)**

[Anna Bogomolnaia](#) (University of Glasgow)  
*Fair mixtures of public outcomes*

[Indrajit Ray](#) (Cardiff University)  
*Any outcome is an interior equilibrium in a market*

10:30 – 11:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

11:00 – 12:30 **Regular Session 4 (Chair: Konstantinos Georgalos)**

[Kirill Pogorelskiy](#) (University of Warwick)  
*News sharing and voting on social networks: an experimental study*

[Tatiana Mayskaya](#) (Higher School of Economics)  
*Implications of overconfidence on information investment*

[Kaustav Das](#) (University of Exeter)  
*Strategic experimentation with competition and private arrival of information*

12:30 – 14:15 **Lunch + Poster Session 2**

[Ludmila Matyskova](#) (CERGE-EI, Charles University)  
*Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition*

[Konstantinos Protopappas](#) (Lancaster University)  
*Competing for advantage: a two-stage contest*

[Nina Bobkova](#) (Bonn Graduate School of Economics)  
*Knowing what matters for others: information choice in auctions*

14:15 – 15:45 **Regular Session 5 (Chair: Sonali SenGupta)**

[Andriy Zapechelnyuk](#) (University of St. Andrews)  
*A delegation approach to persuasion*

[Ryan Kendall](#) (University College London)  
*Decomposing models of bounded rationality*

[Maria Kozlovskaya](#) (Aston University)  
*Signalling expertise in markets for credence goods*

15:45 – 16:15 Break (Coffee and Tea)

16:15 – 17:00 **Plenary Talk 3 (Chair: Alexander Matros)**

[Peter Hammond](#) (University of Warwick and Stanford University)  
*Statistical equilibrium for large games of incomplete information*

17:00 **Farewell**