Cognitive Linguistic Critical Discourse Studies: Connecting Language and Image

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Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce one cognitive school of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) in the form of Cognitive Linguistic approaches. Cognitive Linguistic CDS (CL-CDS) is characterised by an emphasis on the conceptual dimensions of semiosis. Specifically, it addresses the conceptualisations invoked by language and the ideological or legitimating potentials that those conceptualisations might realise in political contexts of communication. I begin the chapter by providing an overview of the different frameworks in CL-CDS before focussing specifically on image schema analysis, illustrated with examples from discourse on political protests. I then go on to make a connection between Cognitive Linguistic and multimodal approaches to CDS. The claim made is that understanding language involves fully modal rather than amodal mental representations. I therefore argue that existing research on the social semiotics of multimodal representation is an important source in considering the meanings of language in use. I illustrate this claim relating linguistic instances of discourse on political protests to visual instances.

1. Cognitive Linguistic CDS

It is now increasingly recognised in CDS that any connection between language and social action is mediated by cognition (Wodak 2006). A number of cognitive approaches to CDS may therefore be identified, including van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach (e.g. van Dijk 1998, 2008, 2014) and several approaches which draw on Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Cap 2013; Charteris-Black 2004; Chilton 2004; Hart 2010, 2015; Koller 2004, 2014; Marin Arrese 2011; Musolff 2004, 2011). Although some researchers have sought to unify these perspectives (e.g. Koller 2005), a number of distinctions between them may be discerned (see Hart 2014b for discussion). For example, while van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach focuses more on the role of context models in text-production, Cognitive Linguistic approaches focus more on the mental processes involved in text interpretation. A further difference lies in their ‘methodological attractors’ (Hart & Cap 2014). While the socio-cognitive approach draws eclectically on various aspects of cognitive psychology, Cognitive Linguistic approaches draw more or less exclusively on specific theories in Cognitive Linguistics. A fundamental difference between them, which arises as a consequence of this, is in their characterisations of meaning. In the socio-cognitive approach, meanings is characterised in more or less propositional terms. In Cognitive Linguistic approaches, by contrast, meaning is treated as imagistic or conceptual in nature. This chapter aims to introduce readers to Cognitive Linguistic approaches to CDS specifically.

CL-CDS is concerned with analysing conceptualisation in discourse and specifically the ideological and legitimating qualities that alternative conceptualisations may carry in contexts of political
communication (Chilton 2004; Hart 2013a/b, 2014a/b). Linguistic units (lexical, grammatical and textual) are seen, from this perspective, as prompts for the activation of various kinds of conceptual structures and processes which are constitutive of meaning. The conceptual structures and processes involved are said to be imagistic in nature, grounded in prior visual and other forms of embodied experience (Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Langacker 2008). Crucially, from a critical standpoint, conceptualisation is subject to construal as alternative patterns of language use prompt for the same target situation to be conceptualised in different ways.¹ It is thus through the process of conceptualisation that language is able to enact ideology as alternate language usages conjure competing images of the same material situation. At least three CL approaches to CDS may be identified, focused on different features of conceptualisation.

The most developed of these is Critical Metaphor Analysis (e.g. Koller 2004; Musolff 2004; Charteris-Black 2004, 2006; see also Charteris-Black, this volume). In Critical Metaphor Analysis, based in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphorical expressions in discourse are seen as linguistic reflexes of, or prompts for, conceptual structures and processes. Metaphors are not seen as mere tropes, then, but rather, the conceptual structures and processes involved in metaphor shape our thoughts and actions. Conceptual metaphors involve a mapping from a source domain onto a target domain in order to provide it with structure. Conceptual metaphors are ideological in so far as the source domain provides a refracting medium through which the target domain construed and where the particular choice of source domain leads to particular patterns of inference within the target domain. Source domains are provided by concrete or salient domains of experience encoded in image schemas (see below) or frames (Fillmore 1982, 1985). Recurring source domains in social and political discourses include frames for JOURNEY, BUILDING, WAR, GAMES and GAMBLING, orientational schemas like UP-DOWN and NEAR-FAR, and naturalised themes like FIRE, WATER, ILLNESS or the WEATHER. However, one schema in particular which has been found to function as a source domain across several social and political discourses is the CONTAINER schema (e.g. Charteris-Black 2006; Chilton 1994, 1996; Hart 2010; Nuñez Perucha 2011). The CONTAINER schema is an especially powerful conceptual structure in political discourse where the inherent topology of schema, defining an inside versus an outside, “operates as a principle of division” (Chilton 1996: 147). It is thus an image schema through which one of the fundamental features of ideologies – polarisation between Us and Them (van Dijk 1998) – is enacted. In the context of the Cold War, for example, Chilton (1996) showed how a conceptual metaphor STATE AS CONTAINER, which underpinned public discourse at the time, “provided a cognitive basis for variant policies of containment, and for imagining ‘two worlds’” (Chilton 1996: 415). A conceptual metaphor found to be salient in immigration discourse is IMMIGRATION IS FLOOD (Charteris-Black 2006; Hart 2010; Santa Ana 2002). The FLOOD frame in this metaphor serves to present immigrants as an inanimate substance and therefore discourages human empathy and ignores individual motives and life stories. It further presents immigration as excessive. The interaction between this metaphor and the COUNTRY IS CONTAINER metaphor, moreover, is likely to invoke emotional responses as it creates an image of the container being perforating allowing the inflow of liquid (Chilton 2004).

¹ The notion of critique in CL-CDS corresponds most closely with that in Critical Linguistics (Fowler 1991; Hodge & Kress 1993) or what Reisigl and Wodak (2001) refer to as sociodiagnostic critique aimed as “the demystifying exposure of the –manifest or latent – persuasive, propagandist, populist, ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices” (p. 32).
Critical Metaphor Analysis is not restricted to the linguistic modality but has been usefully applied to the visual modality too (e.g. Bounegru & Forceville 2011; El Rafaie 2003; Forceville & Urios-Aparisi 2009). Here, scholars have shown that many of the conceptual metaphors evidenced by patterns of linguistic discourse find expression in visual discourse too. For example, El Refaie (2003) shows how the Flood frame is invoked in political cartoons depicting refugees. This cross-modal realisation is predicted by a Cognitive Linguistic perspective, where metaphors are seen as a feature of the conceptual system rather than belonging to any particular communicative modality. It therefore makes sense that they should be reflected in, or articulated through, alternative modes.

A second strand of CL-CDA is found in applications of Discourse Space Theory (e.g. Chilton 2004; Cap 2006, 2013; Dunmire 2011; Filardo Llamas 2013; Filardo Llamas, Hart & Kaal 2015; Kaal 2012). This approach aims to account for meaning construction in ‘discourse beyond the sentence’. According to this approach, meaning is created through the construction of ‘discourse worlds’ – conceptual structures which represent the ontologies defined in or presupposed by a text (Chilton 2004; Gavins 2007). These discourse worlds are constructed inside a deictically defined mental or ‘discourse’ space consisting of three dimensions: space, time and (epistemic and deontic) evaluation. The actors, actions and events explicitly or implicitly referenced in discourse get positioned in the three-dimensional space at distances relative to a spatial, temporal and evaluative ‘deictic centre’ presumed to be shared between speaker and hearer. The coordinates of elements in the discourse world may be indexed by linguistic features of various types, including tense, prepositional phrases, pronouns, and modal expressions or may be derived from frame-based knowledge accessed by the discourse (Chilton 2004: 61). Discourse worlds are important structures in the cognitive study of ideology since they represent a particular worldview which, through discourse, hearers are invited to share in. Based in Discourse Space Theory and further developing its central notion of (metaphorical) distance in conceptualisation, Cap (2006, 2008, 2011, 2013) outlines a model of legitimisation by proximisation. Within this framework, proximisation is defined as rhetorical strategy involving a contraction of the conceptual space between elements initially located at distal points in spatial, temporal or evaluative dimensions and the speaker and hearer’s deictic coordinates in one or other of these dimensions (see Hart 2014a for a revised typology of proximisation strategies). Proximisation has been shown as particularly powerful in interventionist discourses because it construes evolving actions or situations as personally consequential. It has been shown to operate in a range of interventionist discourses including American and British political discourse on action in Iraq (Cap 2006; Hart 2014a), media and political discourses on immigration (Hart 2010, 2014a), and the discourse of the IRA (Filardo-Llamas 2013).

One final strand of CL-CDS is found in the form of image schema analysis drawing on Langacker’s (1991, 2008) Cognitive Grammar (e.g. Hart 2011, 2013a/b, 2015). Image schema analysis addresses the basic structuring of situations and events through the imposition of image schemas. Image schemas are abstract holistic knowledge structures which emerge from repeated patterns of embodied experience (Johnson 1987; Mandler 2004). They arise in basic domains like space, action, force and motion to encode relational information pertaining, for example, to topology, sequence and causation. Image schemas form the foundations of the conceptual system and provide ‘folk theories’ of the way the world works. They later “work their way up into our system of meaning” (Johnson 1987: 42) to become paired with lexical and grammatical units inside the system of symbolic assemblies which makes up language. In discourse, they are invoked by their reflexes in text to constitute our most basic understanding of the referential event, defining its type and internal
structure. Their selection in discourse thus serves an ideological function in categorising and organising reality as well as in directing inference. Different schemas, further, define different semantic roles within the event-structure, thus attributing particular qualities to the actors involved. There is also then an ideological dimension in assigning social actors to the different roles specified within the schema (Wolf & Polzenhagen 2003: 265). I illustrate this form of CL-CDS in more detail in the following section before drawing some connections between Cognitive Linguistic and Multimodal approaches to CDS. Examples come from media discourse on political protests.

2. Example Analysis: A Partial Grammar of Political Protest Reporting

Consider the contrast between (1) and (2):

(1) A number of police officers were injured after they [came under attack from] some wearing scarves to hide their faces. (The Telegraph, 10 November 2010)

(2) Activists who had masked their faces with scarves [traded punches with] police. (The Guardian, 10 November 2010)

At the level of lexicogrammar, the main difference between (1) and (2) lies in the alternative grammatical constructions used to describe the event. In (1), we find a regular transitive construction while in (2) we find a reciprocal construction. Conceptually, the difference between (1) and (2) lies in the alternative image schemas which these grammatical choices invoke to construe the scene in question – a process referred to as schematisation (Croft and Cruse 2004; Hart 2014a). The alternative schemas are modelled in Figure 1.

(a) One-sided action schema

(b) Two-sided action schema

Figure 1. Action schemas

The two schemas are grounded in embodied experience of observing interactions between elements in our physical environments. The one-sided schema in Figure 1(a) represents a unidirectional transfer of energy from the element ‘upstream’ in the energy flow to the element ‘downstream’, resulting in a change of state to the downstream element. The two-sided schema in Figure 1(b) represents events
in which there is a bidirectional transfer of energy between two equally active elements. These schemas come to form the meaningful basis of regular transitive versus reciprocal constructions respectively. In the regular transitive construction, an agent (A) acts upon a patient (P). The vector in the corresponding image schema represents the force and direction of the action designated in the verb. In the reciprocal construction, one participant cannot be said to be active and the other passive but rather both participants are equally agentic. The twin vectors in Figure 1(b) thus represent the bi-directionality of the force designated in the semantics of the verb. These alternate schemas, then, are invoked in discourse by the selection of their linguistic counterparts whereupon they serve to configure the internal structure of the referential situation in different ways. (1), for example, construes the event in terms of the one-sided action schema modelled in Figure 1(a) while (2) construes the same material event in terms of the two-sided action schema modelled in Figure 1(b). The construal invoked by (1) serves to assign sole responsibility for the violence that occurred to the protesters while the construal in (2) recognises the role of the police in the violence that occurred. The alternative conceptualisations may be reflective/constitutive of wider ideologised discourses on the relationship between State and Citizen. The construal in (1) may be seen as instantiating a right-wing conservative discourse in which political protest is demonised and the actions of authorities are not debated while the construal in (2) may be as seen as instantiating a more left-wing liberal discourse which at least calls into question the actions of the authorities. And indeed, in distributional analyses (Hart 2013a/b), it has been found that regular transitive constructions such as (1) with protesters as sole agents occur more frequently in newspapers expected to espouse a more conservative discourse on political protests while reciprocal constructions such as (2) occur more frequently in newspapers expected to espouse a more liberal discourse. These two examples illustrate the ideological and legitimating significance of schematisation. The schemas discussed, however, are just two which, within the parameter of schematisation, contribute to the grammar of protest reporting (see Hart 2013b, 2014a/b for others).

A second dimension of construal addressed in image schema analysis is ‘point of view’. In Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2002, 2008), it is argued that alternate grammatical constructions include within their semantic values a point of view specification. That is, grammatical constructions not only evoke a particular image schema but also encode a point of view from which that image schema is experienced. This arises from the embodied basis of language where our of experiences as visual actors who at any moment experience a scene from a different point of view is exploited to provide meaning to language. The point of view variables available to language cover the full range of this experience. Language, however, seems in practice to make use of only a restricted set of cardinal points of view.

In discourse, these conceptual processes – schematisation and point of view – take place in and across networks of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994, 1997). Image schemas are defined inside an ‘event-space’ (Hart 2010, 2014a) while point of view is defined inside a ‘base space’ (Radden & Dirven 2007) which acts as a grounding space. Variation in point of view operates in at least three dimensions: horizontal, vertical and distal. Here, I illustrate variation in point of view on only the horizontal or spatial dimension of point of view variation. As noted above, the regular transitive and reciprocal constructions described in (1) and (2) are just two possible instantiations of this dimension of point of view variation. For the sake of simplicity, I restrict myself to construing the spatial dimension of point of view variation in terms of two opposite points of view, namely the horizontal (1) and vertical (2) perspectives respectively.

Imagine a moving object crashing into a stationary object compared to two moving objects colliding with one another. Of course, the distribution of constructions may also be used diagnostically to determine the political positions of different institutions.
‘anchorage’ plane (see Hart 2014a, 2015 for a detailed discussion of point of view shifts in all three dimensions). On the anchorage plane, four cardinal points may be identified which correspond to 90°
rotations relative to the inherent or construed directionality of elements within the scene under conception. For example, actions and motions are conceived in terms of vectors which inherently possess directional properties. Points of view may be defined perpendicular to the vector whose direction is then either left-to-right or right-to-left relative to the point of view or in line with the vector which then either points toward or away from the point of view. This is modelled in Figure 2
where the four potential points of view are represented as broken circles. We can assign the potential points of view arbitrary numerical values X 1-4.4

![Figure 2. Potential Points of View on the Anchorage Plane](image)

All four points of view are exploited in media discourse on political protests and thus make up part of the grammar of protest reporting. For example, reciprocal constructions encode a point of view from either cardinal point X1 or X3 while regular transitive constructions encode a point of view from either cardinal point X2 or X4 (see Hart 2014a, 2015). Which particular point of view is determined by further grammatical distinctions within the two types of construction, namely information structure and voice choice respectively. Consider the contrast between (3)-(4) and (5)-(6).

3) [Protesters \textit{agent} \textsuperscript{1}] [clashed with \textit{action} \textsuperscript{8}] [police \textit{agent} \textsuperscript{2}] around the bank of England. (\textit{Telegraph}, 1 April 2009).

4) [Riot police \textit{agent} \textsuperscript{2}] [clash with \textit{action} \textsuperscript{3}] [demonstrators \textit{agent} \textsuperscript{3}]. (\textit{Guardian}, 1 April 2009)

\footnote{Note that the direction of the action and point of view are not fixed in an absolute sense relative to a geographical frame of reference (cf. Levinson 2003) but, rather, are defined relative to one another.}
(5) [A number of police officers were injured as they \textit{patient} came under attack from \textit{action} the protesters \textit{agent}] (\textit{The Times}, 10 November 2010)

(6) [About 50 riot police \textit{agent} tried to drive \textit{action} the crowd \textit{patient} back. (\textit{Independent}, 10th November 2010)

Both (3) and (4) are examples of reciprocal constructions and thus both invoke the two-sided action schema modelled in Figure 2(b) to construe the event. However, the point of view from which the conceptual content in the event space is construed is different in each case. Assuming a configuration as in the event space of Figure 3, the point of view from which the reader is invited to construe the scene in (3) is $X_1$. The point of view that the reader is asked to assume in (4) is $X_3$. This is modelled in Figure 3(a) versus 3(b) respectively.

Figure 3. Point of view in reciprocal constructions

The contrasting points of view are motivated by an iconic correspondence between the linear organisation of the clause and the left-right organisation of conceptual content (cf. Perniss et al. 2010). Based on this correspondence, the information sequence in (3) promotes a point of view which organises the event relative to this point of view as in Figure 3(a) with the protesters on the left and the police on the right, while the information sequence in (4) promotes a point of view which results in the relative spatial organisation in Figure 3(b) with the police on the left and the protesters on the right.

In the case of regular transitive constructions, the point of view is determined by voice choice. Here, the active voice invites a construal from cardinal point $X_2$ while the passive voice invites a construal from cardinal point $X_4$. Thus, the regular transitive construction in (5) invites the reader to construe the scene from cardinal point $X_4$, at the head end of the vector and downstream of the energy flow. In the richer simulation, this point of view invites the reader to place themselves in the shoes of the patient. This is achieved at the level of schematisation by means of a role connector ($R$) (Fauconnier 1994, 1997) which links participants across mental spaces. This is modelled in Figure 4(a). In contrast
to (5), the transitive construction in (6) is in the active voice. The point of view promoted is thus from cardinal point $X_2$ at the tail end of the vector. From this point of view, the reader is asked to assume in the simulation the role of the AGENT, again achieved at the level of schematisation by means of a role connector. This is modelled in Figure 4(b).

![Diagram](image)

(a) Point of view $X_4$
transitive construction (passive)

(b) Point of view $X_2$
transitive construction (active)

**Figure 4.** Point of view in active versus passive voice

The ideological significance of the point of view distinctions found in (3)-(6) can be examined through their distributions in a corpus of protest reports. Here, for example, Hart (2013a/b) found that when reciprocal constructions are used, the construal modelled in Figure 3(a) is preferred by more conservative newspapers for whom the police/protesters typically constitute the in/out-group respectively, while more liberal newspapers tend to favour the construal modelled in Figure 3(b). Similarly, when regular transitive constructions are used, the passive voice and thus the construal modelled in Figure 4(a) tends to be favoured when police are patients in a violent action but the active voice and thus the construal modelled in Figure 4(b) is preferred when the police are encoded as agents in legitimated actions, like ‘drive back’, which construe the police as defenders of civil order rather than perpetrators of state violence.

The ideological significance of both schematisation and point of view, however, as well as the other construal operations described in CL-CDS, can also be explored through more qualitative functional analyses. Here, CL-CDS can gain valuable insights from multimodal approaches to CDS. Indeed, the critical impetus of the CL-CDS can be seen, at least in part, to emerge from the combination of Cognitive Linguistic and multimodal forms of analysis (Hart 2014a, 2015, 2016).

3. Connections with Multimodality

At the level of schematisation described above, the abstract mental imagery invoked by language encodes information relating to basic structural properties of the scene like spatial topology and
sequential organisation (Langacker 1991; Talmy 2000). Conceptualisation, however, involves at least two levels of mental representation. At a higher level, it involves much richer more specified imagery, not designated in the lexical or grammatical units of the utterance but derived from background knowledge and past experience, encoded in a mental simulation of the target scene (see Bergen 2012 for an overview). By simulation it is meant an “experience resembling perceptual or motor experience occurring in the absence of the relevant external stimuli, in the case of perceptual experience; or without actual execution of motor actions, in the case of motor imagery” (Bergen et al. 2007: 735). That is to say, in other words, that language use involves the activation of imagery and imagined scenarios based on past experience including, presumably, mediatised visuo-semiotic experience (see Hart, in press, for extensive discussion of this and its implications for CDS).

Information included in mental simulations pertains, inter alia, to the colour, shape, size, and orientation of objects (Stanfield & Zwaan 2001; Zwaan et al. 2002) as well as to the length, rate and direction of motion of described objects (Glenberg & Kaschak 2002; Kaschak et al. 2005; Matlock 2004). Simulations, moreover, are not run in a disconnected way but with simulated situatedness, run from the perspective of an ‘immersed experiencer’ (Bergen 2012; Zwaan 2004). That is, the conceptualiser imagines the scene unfolding from the perspective of an actor (i.e. AGENT or PATIENT) in or a witness to the scene. The particular perspective corresponds with the point of view specification determined by the semantic values of alternative grammatical constructions (Bergen et al. 2004; Bergen and Chang 2005). Conceptualising a scene from the perspective of an immersed experiencer also means that affective systems which serve to guide judgement, reasoning and decision-making processes (Damasio 1994) are run concomitantly as part of the simulation.

Colour, shape, size, orientation, rate and direction of motion, and point of view are, of course, precisely the kind of semiotic variables whose functions have been extensively studied in multimodal (critical) discourse analysis (e.g. Kress & van Leeuwen 2006; Machin 2007; Machin & Mayr 2012 O’Halloran 2004; van Leeuwen 2010; see also van Leeuwen, this volume). Multimodal studies can therefore provide important insights into linguistic meaning. If language prompts for the construction of fully modal mental representations, possessing properties whose meaning potentials have already been analysed in multimodal discourse analysis, then it follows that multimodal discourse analysis can shed light on the nuances of meaning communicated through language. A good starting point here, I suggest, is with Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2006) ‘grammar of visual design’ or the systems of FORM (including COLOUR and SHAPE) and PERSPECTIVE (including DEEP SPACE and POINT OF VIEW) proposed in Lim (2004: 236).

Relatedly, since there is no principled reason to suppose that such semiotic variables should function differently in linguistic versus visual modes of communication, critical insights from multimodal studies into the ideological and/or legitimating potentials of values within these systems can be directly bought to bear in analysing the ideological and/or legitimating potentials of language. A second important corollary is that the processes involved in linguistic meaning can be characterised in the same terms as in multimodal studies. The point of view shifts described in Section 2, for example, can be characterised as panning (Hart 2014a/b, 2015). This is more than just an analogy and reflects instead the principle that language is embodied, related in particular to visual experience. A third consequence for CDS is that the meanings of language usages in any given context are dependent on patterns in visual articulations of the same discourse. This works as follows. In the case of most social and political discourses, language users do not have first-hand experiences of the situations
being described. Rather, such situations are experienced second-hand through images. The meaning of a linguistic expression in social and political discourse is thus, at least in part, a function of the images to which one has previously been exposed in contexts of similar language usages. To study the meaning of language in social and political discourses therefore entails studying patterns of visual representation within the same discourse. It may further suggest, specifically, investigating the extent to which configurations of linguistic and visual representation correspond with one another when they co-occur in multimodal texts (for example, in the case of photographs and their captions).

Let us now see how all this relates to examples of linguistic discourse on political protests. Figure 5 shows four photographs documenting political protests in London. The photographs reflect the kind of conceptual content likely to be encoded in the simulations invoked by examples (1) – (6). Information relating to the participants, including their age, race, gender, facial expressions, body postures, clothing (type and colour), effectors (shields, truncheons, sticks, bottles etc.), present in the images, will all form part of the mental representations invoked by utterances like (1) – (6). These features should all therefore enter into any linguistic analysis too. My focus in this chapter, however, is on one particular contrasting feature presented by the images, namely point of view. The images each present a different point of view on the anchorage plane relative to actors and/or vectors in the image. The semiotic experience provided by these images is thus likely to be reflected in the simulated experiences evoked by language usages like (1) – (6). Specifically, the images in Figure 5(a)-(d) share corresponding point of view specifications with the grammatical constructions exemplified in (3) – (6) respectively. The simulated experience, i.e. the meaning, evoked by linguistic instantiations (3) – (6) will therefore reflect the semiotic experiences we have in encountering images such as those in Figure 5(a)-(d) respectively. Thus, the ideological/(de)delegitimating functions of linguistic examples like (3) – (6) are best illuminated by critically analysing, in light of findings from multimodal discourse analysis, images like those in Figure 5.

\[\text{(a) Point of View } X_1 \] 
\[\text{(b) Point of View } X_3 \]

\[\text{(© EPA)} \] 
\[\text{(© PA)} \]

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5 I am using these photographs only to illustrate the theory. I make no claim as to their representativeness, which would require semantic tagging and statistical analyses of a large corpus of images.

6 For Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) action and motion in images are represented by vectors created within the image.
The images in Figure 5(a) and 5(b) both present a point of view in which the actors in the image are seen in profile orientation. The angle between the sightline of the viewer and vectors in the image representing action is perpendicular. For Kress and van Leeuwen (2006: 136), this oblique angle creates a sense of detachment. The viewer is positioned outside of the event depicted. The position, moreover, is one of relative neutrality as the point of view is not from one side or the other but, rather, the viewer is forced to occupy the middle ground between the police and protesters. As a consequence of the contrasting point of views they present, however, the two images differ in the spatial organisation of the actors involved. In 5(a) the police occupy the left region of the image and the protesters the right, while in 5(b) it is the protesters who occupy the right region of the image and the police the left. The two images are not completely neutral, therefore, since left versus right are found in multimodal studies to have different value associations. There is disagreement, though, in precisely what the value associations of left and right are. In Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), for example, spatial left and spatial right are treated as signifying Given versus New information. Elements in the left region of an image are thus attributed the status of ‘established’ or ‘unquestioned’ while elements in the right region are attributed the status of ‘controversial’ or ‘contested’. Casasanto (2009), by contrast, has shown experimentally that left positioning is associated with negative valence while right positioning is associated with more positive valence. Elements in the left region of an image, on this account, are therefore attributed the status of ‘bad’ while elements in the right region are attributed the status of ‘good’.

The reality in practice is that the particular associations of left and right are likely to be culture-, context-, and/or individual-specific. Nevertheless, Casasanto’s work at least demonstrates a default tendency which would suggest that for many readers the image in Figure 5(a) will invite a more negative appraisal of the police relative to the protesters while the image in Figure 5(b) is likely to invite a more negative appraisal of the protesters relative to the police. Based on the argument made above, then, that grammatical constructions encode spatialized mental representations, and that the point of view specifications encoded by reciprocal constructions such as

7 For Casasanto, this is down to the positive embodied experience most people have, given their right-handedness, of controlling objects located to the right compared to objects located to the left. This raises interesting questions as to the effect of handedness on interpreting image and language.

8 A corpus analysis comparing distributions across newspapers known to adopt competing ideological stances would add to the weight of evidence here.
those in (3) and (4) invoke mental experiences resembling those invoked by the images in 5(a) and 5(b) respectively, we may say that while (3) and (4) are more neutral in comparison to (5) and (6), (3) confers a more negative evaluation on the protesters relative to the police while (4) confers a more negative evaluation on the police relative to the protesters.

In the simulations invoked by (3) and (4), the viewer is asked to adopt the situated perspective of an eye-witness. In parallel with the images in 5(a) and 5(b), we can characterise the points of view encoded in these constructions as an ‘observer’s’ perspective. This is in contrast to the ‘involved’ perspective encoded in the regular transitive constructions exemplified in (5) and (6) and whose meanings reflect the semiotic experience presented by images 5(c) and 5(d) respectively. The point of view in 5(c) and 5(d) is one in which the sightline of the viewer and the vectors in the image representing action are not perpendicular to one another but are more or less overlain. For Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), this straight angle positions the viewer not as an eye-witness to the scene but as a participant in it. Which participant depends on the particular point of view presented and the relationship this sets up with action vectors in the image. When the point of view is such that the vector is pointing away from the viewer, the viewer is invited into the role of AGENT. When the point of view is such that the vector is pointing toward the viewer, they are invited into the role of PATIENT. In Figure 5(c), where the process depicted is a violent action, the point of view is at the tail end of the vector. The viewer is therefore positioned on the side of the PATIENT, in this case the individualised police officer, and sees the scene unfolding from this perspective. In 5(c), the viewer is thus asked to identify with the police rather than the protesters, with whom they are placed in confrontation.9 From this point of view, not only is the viewer in a position of alignment and confrontation with the police and protesters respectively, but the aggressive action depicted in the image is seen as directed toward the viewer themselves. The image is thus highly rhetorically charged. In Figure 5(d), the point of view is from the head of the vector with the viewer positioned on the side of the AGENT. In this image, the police are agentive and so the viewer is similarly asked to identify with the police and imagine themselves as agents in the action depicted. From this perspective, however, the action the viewer is invited into is not one of ‘attacking’ but, rather, ‘defending’.

The two images are highly ideologised. In both of these images, the viewer is asked to see the world from the point of view of the police who are only agents in legitimated actions but who have to face the violent actions of protesters. The argument being made here is that in the case of regular transitive constructions like (5) and (6), the passive versus the active voice invite simulations from the perspective of the PATIENT versus the AGENT respectively. The meaning of (5) and (6) will thus resemble the visuo-semiotic experience presented by the images in Figures 5(c) and 5(d) along with all the ideological and rhetorical force that these experiences carry. In the simulation evoked by (5), the conceptualiser ‘sees’ the event from the perspective of the police as PATIENT. They therefore experience the event as if they were on the receiving end of the violent action. In the simulated experience, systems of affect are integrated to create a similar sense of threat as conjured by the image in Figure 5(c).10 In the simulation evoked by (6), the conceptualiser ‘sees’ the event from the

9 That we make a link between spatial point of view and social value positions is evidenced in metaphorical expressions like ‘we see things the same way’ or ‘we share the same outlook on life’.
10 This raises questions concerning the orthodox view of the ideological functions of the passive voice (cf. Fowler at al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1993)
perspective of the police as AGENT. They therefore experience police action in the same way as evoked by the image in Figure 5(d). Examples like (5) and (6) can thus, on the back of combined insights from Cognitive Linguistics and multimodal discourse analysis can, beyond what is revealed by a transitivity analysis alone, be said to instantiate a discourse of legitimacy/delegitimation in relation to police and protesters respectively. More than instantiating a particular worldview, however, examples like (5) and (6) invite the hearer to at least temporarily inhabit the world of the police, as it is presented by the discourse.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have introduced the Cognitive Linguistic school of Critical Discourse Studies. CL-CDS comes with a particular model of language in which both lexical and the grammatical units are seen, when selected in discourse, as prompts for a variety of construal operations in the cognitive process of conceptualisation. Conceptualisation is held to be imagistic in nature, involving the activation of abstract schematic images as well as richer imagery provided by embodied simulations. I have focussed on two conceptual processes, schematisation and point of view, in the context of discourse on political protests. Since understanding language involves the activation of imagery, I have argued that the ideological import of linguistic constructions can be most clearly gleaned from analyses, based in multimodal discourse analysis, of images with corresponding content and structural properties. A number of questions remain to be addressed here. However, I hope to have at least demonstrated the merits of Cognitive Linguistics applied in CDS and of integrating Cognitive Linguistic and multimodal methods.

References


Talmy, L 2000, Toward a cognitive semantics, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.


