1. Introduction

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Cognitive Linguistics were established at around the same time with the publications of *Language and Control* (Fowler et al. 1979) and *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). They developed in quite different academic contexts, though, and until relatively recently did not come into contact. In the last few years, however, a highly productive space has been created for Cognitive Linguistics inside CDA (Charteris-Black 2004, 2006a/b; Koller 2004, 2005; Musolff 2004, 2006). So far, this space has been reserved almost exclusively for Critical Metaphor Analysis where Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory has provided the lens through which otherwise naturalised or opaque ideological patterns could be detected in language and thought. But Cognitive Linguistics, like CDA, is not a single discipline. It is, rather, a perspective on a range of linguistic phenomena. Its potential efficacy for CDA may therefore extend beyond Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight (i) the place of Cognitive Linguistics in CDA and (ii) that Cognitive Linguistics can be incorporated into CDA to disclose various ideological dimensions of text and conceptualisation including but without being limited to metaphor. The chapter is organised in the following way. In section 2, I discuss some points of congruence and contention between CDA and Cognitive Linguistics. In section 3, the reader’s attention is drawn to a number of ‘construal operations’ proposed in Cognitive Linguistics which may be significant for CDA. And in section 4, I provide a typology of construal operations relating them to general cognitive abilities and discursive strategies. Throughout, our analysis will focus on immigration discourse in the genre of print news media.

2. CDA and Cognitive Linguistics

Although Fowler et al. (1979) and Kress and Hodge (1979) draw to some extent on Chomsky’s Transformational Grammar, it is Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar which provides the ‘theoretical underpinning of Critical Linguistics’ (Fowler 1996: 5) and which has continued to be the theoretical mainstay of most CDA (Chilton 2005: 21; Wodak 2001: 8).
Indeed, some understanding of Systemic Functional Grammar is seen as essential for any proper understanding of CDA (Wodak 2001: 8). Where Fowler (1991: 5) and Fairclough (1989: 11) both suggest that functionalist theories of language are more suitable for service in critical analysis than formalist theories, Hallidayan grammar has been a natural theoretical framework for CDA to turn to.

Van Dijk, of course, adopts a cognitive approach to CDA (e.g. 1998, 2002). However, he does not apply any cognitive theory of language per se. In fact, cognitive theories of language have on the whole been excluded from CDA. As a result, O’Halloran has noted that much of CDA suffers from ‘a paucity of appreciation of language cognition’ (2003: 14). Up until relatively recently, Cognitive Linguistics in particular has not been strongly represented in the literature (Chilton 2005: 21). However, a dedicated Cognitive Linguistic approach can now be recognised. But despite the success of this approach, which has largely found its niche in CMA, it continues to be marginalised (and even maligned) by some researchers. Its consignment to the periphery of CDA may be the result of some misunderstandings and misapprehensions surrounding the approach, which are therefore worth briefly pointing out.

One striking confusion concerns the status of Cognitive Linguistics. Consider the following statement from Wodak, for example: ‘most of the on-going research in Cognitive Linguistics related to CDA is restricted to a small field (with the exception of van Dijk’s work): investigating metaphors in the tradition of cognitive metaphor theory’ (2006: 181). Aside from the fact that CMA can no longer be described as a ‘small field’, Wodak seems to mistake “Cognitive Linguistics” to refer to any cognitively-oriented language study. However, Cognitive Linguistics is a specific discipline of Cognitive Science, associated with Lakoff, Langacker, Talmy, Taylor, Fillmore and Fauconnier, which has developed a unique conception of grammar and semantics as based on the same general cognitive principles and conceptual processes. Cognitive Linguistic theories do not feature in van Dijk’s work at all, although the Cognitive Linguistic Approach has been successfully aligned with the Socio-Cognitive Approach elsewhere (cf. Koller 2004; Hart 2008, in press).

Another potential confusion would be a perceived incompatibility between a cognitive theory of grammar and CDA. However, Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar and Systemic Functional Grammar are both, in fact, broadly functional (Nuyts 2007). And in line with this shared functionalist perspective, both adopt a ‘usage-based’ conception of grammar (ibid. p.554). Moreover, the view that language-use construes experience and alternate grammatical structures are meaningful, a claim integral to CDA, is held in both Cognitive and Functional Grammar. In Cognitive Grammar, for example, Langacker (1991: 295) says that ‘it is precisely because of their conceptual import – the contrasting images they impose – that alternate grammatical devices are commonly available to code the same situation’.

One contention raised by Wodak regarding cognitive theories of language in CDA is that ‘nobody can actually “look” into somebody’s or one’s own brain’ (2006: 180). That is, cognitive processes cannot be studied directly (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). However, Cognitive Linguistics does not claim that it can ‘look’ directly into the brain. Rather, it argues that, since communication necessarily involves conceptualisation, and language is based on the same system that we use in thought and action, linguistic structure affords indirect access to conceptual processes. In this sense, language is for Cognitive Linguists ‘a window to the mind’ (Fauconnier 1999: 96). Wodak (2006: 180) recognises that discursive processes, such as identity construction, inherently involve cognitive processes, which she
Christopher Hart

suggests need to be spelled out. Cognitive Linguistics is therefore a useful framework for CDA because it can disclose the conceptual processes that play a fundamental part in the communication of ideology.

Such conceptual processes are described in Cognitive Linguistics as ‘construal operations’ (Croft and Cruse 2004). The notion of ‘construal’ refers to the fact that the same situation or event is potentially conceptualised in any number of different ways but alternative language structures necessarily encode some particular conceptualisation, which is prompted in text-consumers (Langacker 1991). Langacker (2008: 55) uses an analogy with visual perception to capture the essence of construal: ‘in viewing a scene, what we actually see depends on how closely we examine it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most attention to, and where we view it from’. Linguistic structures in texts therefore reflect the text-producer’s own - ideologically constrained - conceptualisation of events, or at least the conceptualisation that they wish to promote in order to realise macro-level discourse goals like legitimization (Cap 2006; Chilton 2004; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Leeuwen 2007).

Cognitive Linguistics, then, is useful for CDA because in its theory of conceptualisation, a dynamic cognitive process that takes place ‘online’ at either end of the communicative event and involves the recruitment of existing knowledge structures to construe experience, it can address both description- and interpretation-stage analysis, the latter of which has not been properly attended to in CDA (Fowler 1996; O’Halloran 2003). And in interpretation-stage analysis, Cognitive Linguistics can explicitly address the relationship between linguistic and conceptual structure, something which CDA has hitherto taken for granted. In so doing, Cognitive Linguistics can provide new theoretical perspectives on key claims in CDA which have recently been called into question. For example, that grammatical metaphor can ‘mystify’ agency (cf. O’Halloran 2003; Widdowson 2004). And moreover, whilst CDA has had a high mileage out of a relatively small selection of linguistic processes like transitivity and nominalization (Fowler 1996: 5), Cognitive Linguistics offers insights into a spectrum of linguistic and conceptual phenomena and can therefore add to the inventory of analytical categories targeted in CDA.

A number of different construal operations, then, have been proposed in Cognitive Linguistics. However, Croft and Cruse (2004: 46) classify construal operations as instantiations of four general cognitive processes: attention, comparison, perspective and constitution. Below, I highlight some of those construal operations which are most significant for CDA and for immigration discourse in particular.

### 3. Construal Operations

#### 3.1 Profiling/backgrounding
One pervasive construal operation, which involves attention, is profiling and its automatic reflex in backgrounding. Attention is our general cognitive ability to ‘focus’ on particular aspects of a given scene or scenario with differing degrees of salience and ‘granularity’ (Croft and Cruse 2004: 47). This construal operation is especially important for CDA because it provides some conceptual basis for the claim that grammatical metaphor can mystify agency. One of the original claims in Critical Linguistics was that passivization, for example, weakens or altogether conceals the link between agent and action (Hodge and Kress 1993: 26). Agentless passivization is therefore seen as a linguistic strategy that allows text-producers to
gloss over agency in actions that might not fit comfortably within the overall ideological framework of the discourse (Toolan 1991: 228). For example, in immigration discourse deportation might be treated as a potentially controversial action and reported in the passive voice as in (1):

(1) *The Mirror*, 8 April 2004

Thirty-five Nigerian immigrants were deported yesterday under the latest asylum crackdown.

The ideological significance of mystification has been challenged on the grounds that agency is nearly always recoverable from context, based on pragmatic principles such as relevance (Widdowson 2000; O’Halloran 2003). Van Leeuwen therefore distinguishes between ‘suppression’ and ‘backgrounding’. Agency is rarely completely suppressed but it can be backgrounded where agents are ‘not so much excluded as de-emphasised, pushed into the background’ (Van Leeuwen 1996: 39). That the role of the agent can be conceptually backgrounded by agentless passives finds support in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991).

According to this framework, voice alternations carry some conceptual import and are paired at the conceptual level with variants of a particular image schematic representation. The image schematic representation (or image schema) here is an ‘action chain’. An action chain represents a transfer of energy from one participant to another indefinitely until a participant is reached whose reaction does not entail the transfer of energy to any further participants (Langacker 2002: 215). The profiled portion of the action chain is that section ‘downstream’ of and including the entity selected as subject. The prototypical active clause exemplified by the hypothetical example in (2) profiles the whole action chain whereby an agent (A), appearing in the subject (S) of the clause, causes (=>) a change in state or location (->) of a patient (P) in the object (O) of the clause, as represented in figure 1.

(2) Authorities deported thirty-five Nigerian immigrants yesterday under the latest asylum crackdown.

![Figure 1](image.png)

Within Cognitive Grammar, the main function of the passive construction is to de-focus the agent (Langacker 1991: 336). This de-focussing is in actuality a reflex of profiling the patient as the clausal subject. The clausal structure in (1), then, designates an agentive process. The agent is therefore still within the ‘scope of attention’. It is not completely suppressed. However, in contrast to (2), by virtue of being unspecified in the agentless passive, the agent is left conceptually ‘out of focus’ relative to the patient. As Langacker (2008: 384) puts it:

> when one participant is left unspecified, the other becomes more salient just through the absence of competition. On the other hand, augmenting the salience of one
participant diminishes that of others (in relative terms), even when they are fully specified.

The image schema associated with (1) can be modelled as in figure 2 where the heavier lines indicate the profiled portion of the action chain relative to the scope.

![Figure 2](image)

3.2 Metonymy

Metonymy is a particular kind of profiling/backgrounding. It is treated in Cognitive Linguistics as a conceptual shift in reference (Kövecses and Radden 1998). The semantic associations that support metonymy can be divided into ‘extrinsic’ or ‘intrinsic’ associations (Croft Cruse 2004: 217). Extrinsic associations are held between two contingent entities. For example, between persons and the place where the persons are located. Intrinsic associations are either inherent or at least relatively fixed. For example, between a person and an attribute of the person. Intrinsic metonymy can be further divided into cases that involve a conceptual shift ‘inwards’ or ‘outwards’.

It has been suggested in CDA that metonymy can serve several ideological functions in immigration discourse. For example, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) maintain that extrinsic metonymy can mystify agency. And that intrinsic metonymy can be used either to emphasize certain (usually undesirable) characteristics of an individual in referential strategies or to construct and disseminate social stereotypes (ibid.). As with agentless passives, Cognitive Linguistic analyses of metonymy suggest it carries some conceptual import.

Extrinsic metonymies often involve a conceptual shift of reference from an agent onto some other associated entity as in INSTRUMENT FOR AGENT or PRODUCT FOR PERSON(S) metonymies. In the framework of Cognitive Grammar, Langacker (2002) argues that these types of metonymy involve, again, profiling (and thus backgrounding) within an action chain. Consider the following example:

(3) *Daily Mail, 11 June 2002*

An amendment to the Immigration and Asylum Bill going through parliament will exempt such people [asylum seekers] from the 1948 National Assistance Act.

(3) designates an action chain involving an agent (A), a theme (T) and a patient (P). The agent is, of course, the members of Parliament responsible for passing the changes to the bill, whilst the theme is the amendment itself and the patient is asylum seekers. In this PRODUCT FOR PERSON(S) metonymy, it is the interaction between the theme and the patient that is profiled, leaving the agent, which is ‘upstream’ of the subject, within the scope of attention but out of focus, as represented in figure 3. In the diagram, the double arrows
Moving beyond Metaphor in the Cognitive Linguistic Approach to CDA

represent the interactions between participants and their orientation indicates the direction of energy flow. The stepped arrow indicates the resultant effect on the patient.

![Diagram](image)

This kind of analysis, then, provides some conceptual evidence to support the claim in CDA that metonymies can keep responsible actors ‘in the semantic background’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 58).

Intrinsic metonymy also involves profiling but not within an action chain. Rather, intrinsic metonymy profiles either an element of a given ‘dominion’ (a concept or category which provides the scope of attention for its elements) or the dominion as a whole, encompassing all its elements; which depends on whether the conceptual shift in reference is inwards or outwards. Consider the following example, then, of intrinsic metonymy:

(4) *Sunday Times*, 21 May 2006

Tony McNulty, the immigration minister, seemed to accept that there may be between 310,000 and 570,000 illegals in Britain.

This *ATTRIBUTE FOR ENTITY* metonymy involves a conceptual shift of reference inwards, profiling a particular element (the legal status) of a group of individuals (its dominion). The ideological effect of this construal is that individuals as a whole, who have histories and motives, are backgrounded whilst one particular (conferred as opposed to inherent) aspect of their identity, which based on a topos of crime warrants that they be treated as criminals, is selected as the focus of attention. The image schema invoked in this construal is represented in figure 4.

![Diagram](image)

Conceptual shifts of reference outwards can be seen in *CLASS FOR INDIVIDUALS* metonymies such as (5):

Christopher Hart

[It] isn’t because the British are workshy but because the Poles are willing to work for less money.

According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001:56) this type of metonymy has the function of creating ‘difference-levelling sameness and homogeneity, which are the basis on which people are treated uniformly and undifferentially’. Conceptually, this occurs as a group of individuals are referred to under the same category (see subsequent section). In which case, the dominion itself gets profiled as in figure 5.

![Focus (class: the Poles)](image)

Figure 5

The profiled category occludes attention to the elements it encompasses, which are all accorded the same predication by virtue of falling within the referential frame of the metonymic nominal. Such outward intrinsic metonyms, then, allow speakers to make generalisations which can, in turn, give rise to social stereotypes.

### 3.3 Categorization

In Cognitive Linguistics, categories are one kind of ‘idealised cognitive model’ (Lakoff 1987). Idealised cognitive models are relatively stable structures in semantic memory. They are constructed through experience (including discourse) and subsequently called upon in conceptualisation to construe experience. They are idealised in the sense that they are abstractions. Categories are conceptual structures which serve to demarcate phenomena. That is, to classify objects, entities, actions, events, situations, and processes as instantiations of some particular ‘type’ or ‘kind’. Categorization is thus a construal operation based on comparison, a fundamental cognitive ability (Langacker 1987: 103-105). It occurs in the application of a particular word or phrase to describe, denote or refer to a given object, entity, action, etc. Categorization involves comparison where the phenomenon encoded is judged as belonging to the same class of phenomena to which the selected linguistic expression has been previously applied (Croft and Cruse 2004: 54).

Categories are thus constructed through discourse. Not only are they idealised, then, but they may also be ideological, constructed by repeated applications of a label by text-producers with vested interests. For example, categorization is the conceptual process involved in referential strategies, by means of which text-producers classify social actors (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen 1996). In immigration discourse, a number of linguistic resources are utilised in reference, including nationyms (the Poles), anthroponyms (immigrants) and actionyms (asylum-seekers) (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). One ideological effect of referring to social entities by these (metonymic) means is to profile particular features of identity and thus highlight relations of difference between actors construed as members of one category (out-groups) compared to another (the in-group).
Moving beyond Metaphor in the Cognitive Linguistic Approach to CDA

A further ideological effect arises where categorization is subject to prototype effects. Categories are radial structures with more or less prototypical instantiations (Lakoff 1987). However, the concept evoked by a given classification is likely to be the prototype concept within the category, which is itself discursively constructed through repeated predications. Thus, the concept evoked by ‘immigrant’ is likely to be that of an ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT. Similarly, the concept evoked by ‘asylum seeker’ is most likely to be the one more narrowly denoted by ‘economic migrant’ rather than the one denoted by ‘refugee’.

Particular classifications also frame experience (Lakoff 2004) as the concepts they denote activate evaluatively loaded frames or scripts (Fillmore 1982; Schank and Abelson 1977), which, in turn, provide the base against which the profiled concept is understood. For example, ECONOMIC MIGRANT activates a different frame, and therefore provides a different set of narratives and assumptions, to REFUGEE. Whether an individual is categorised as ECONOMIC MIGRANT or a REFUGEE, then, is conceptually very significant.

One further ideological dimension of categorization is that categories, because they have fuzzy boundaries, are susceptible to ‘semantic contagion’ (Charteris-Black 2006b: 574). For example, the categories of IMMIGRANT, ASYLUM SEEKER and TERRORIST may sometimes overlap allowing one to bleed into the other. This can give rise to a double metonymy in which a particular example of IMMIGRANT – THE TERRORIST – stands for a subcategory of IMMIGRANTS – ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS – which, in turn, represents the whole category of IMMIGRANTS (ibid.). According to Charteris-Black (ibid.) this semantic contagion is facilitated by the construal of immigrants and terrorists as members of the same superordinate CRIMINAL category which is further reinforced by collocation as in (6):

(6) **Sunday Telegraph, 8 May 2005**

The decision to let them in without checks, which breaches the Immigration Act, left passengers fearful that the security lapse provided an open door to **terrorists, immigrants** and **asylum seekers**.

### 3.4 Scalar Adjustment

The construal operation of scalar adjustment, which is based on the general cognitive process of attention, involves the apprehension of some category to classify an entity or process at a particular point on a scale. This adjustment can be a qualitative one along a scale of specificity or a quantitative one along some measurable scale (Croft and Cruse 2004: 52-53). In both cases it involves focussing attention on a more or less inclusive level of meaning. Consider (7) – (9) by way of example:

(7) **Mail on Sunday, 4 April 2004**

The poll reveals that three in four believe Britain is already overcrowded and more than one in four voters believe the flow of foreigners to this country should be halted altogether.

(8) **The Daily Telegraph, 5 April 2002**

Reopening the bilateral agreement, which had previously helped to control the flow of asylum seekers, would benefit Britain, Mr Letwin argued.

(9) **The Sun, 18 Aug. 2003**
Britain is demanding a halt to the flood of asylum seekers swamping the nation, a shock Sun poll reveals today.

In (7) and (8) we see a qualitative difference in construal between the complex noun phrases ‘the flow of foreigners’ and ‘the flow of asylum seekers’. Note that the category denoted by ‘foreigners’ is more encompassing than the subordinate category denoted by ‘asylum seekers’. Ideologically, text-producers can select categories at greater or lesser levels of specificity so as to include certain social actors and exclude others from the scope of the predication. In (8) compared to (9) we see a quantitative adjustment along an antonymic scale. Notice that the meaning of ‘flood’ contains the meaning of ‘flow’ but not vice versa. Ideologically, then, the choice of ‘flood’ in (9) frames the same process as more excessive than the choice of ‘flow’ in (8).

There is also a scalar adjustment in ‘granularity’ encoded by the head of the nominalizing, complex metaphorical noun phrase in each of these examples. The metaphor (see following section), in which the head noun is the vehicle, construes the movement of individuals as a single moving mass. That is, as if viewed from a distance so that the image becomes more ‘coarse-grained’. This construal operation serves to de-individuate the entities involved and present immigration as a simple phenomenon.

3.5 Metaphor

Metaphor is another construal operation based on comparison which, like categorization, can act as a framing device. Metaphor has been increasingly recognised as significant in ideological communication and persuasion (Charteris-Black 2004, 2006a; Koller 2004). It involves the apprehension of concrete, familiar areas of experience to construe more abstract and unfamiliar experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In other words, metaphorical expressions in discourse reflect and reinforce the way we think about given phenomena in the world.

In Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor is treated either as a construal operation involving the direct ‘mapping’ of elements in a ‘source domain’ onto corresponding elements in a ‘target domain’ so that the elements in the target domain are understood in terms of the elements in the source domain (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) or as a construal operation involving the ‘blending’ of counterpart elements in two ‘input spaces’, structured by different domains, to create new, emergent elements in a third ‘blended space’ (Fauconnier and Turner 2002). I have argued elsewhere, and will not pursue the argument again here, that the blending account of metaphor is, on technical and compatibility grounds, the more appropriate tool for CDA (Hart 2008). For present purposes, we focus on the final conceptualisation arrived at in the metaphor rather than the precise details behind how we actually get there.  

One metaphor which seems to be a recurring feature of immigration discourse is the COUNTRY AS CONTAINER metaphor (see Chilton 1994; Charteris-Black 2006b). In this metaphor, the country is construed as a container and the population as its contents. The schema invoked in this construal, then, is the CONTAINER/CONTENT schema represented in figure 6. This schema consists of two types of entity: the container is the ‘landmark’ (LM) and its contents is the ‘trajector’ (TR). The container has four structural properties: an interior and an exterior, which are defined by a boundary, and volume.
The most obvious linguistic items that encode a CONTAINER/CONTENT construal are the prepositions \textit{in}, \textit{inside} and \textit{into}. Consider (10) for example. However, a CONTAINER/CONTENT construal is also encoded by other lexical items.

(10) \textit{Daily Mail}, 12 Jan. 2006

It is estimated there are [870,000 illegal immigrants \text{TR}] in [Britain \text{LM}]

Two ideological implications that arise from the CONTAINER/CONTENT schema are (i) that contents either properly ‘belong’ in the container or do not; and (ii) that the container has a limited capacity. The first of these implications has the effect of imposing a dichotomous Us versus Them construal. In other words, the schema can operate as a ‘principle of division’ (Chilton 1996: 147). The second implication functions as a topos of space which seems to justify or warrant restrictive immigration policies.\textsuperscript{9} The topos of space can be formulated as follows: if an entity has a limited area or capacity, then its contents should be managed so as not to exceed that limit. The implication that the country has a limited capacity is made explicit in (11):

(11) \textit{The Express}, 8 Aug. 2006

(M)inisters may not have noticed but [Britain \text{LM}] is \textbf{full up} ...

In dynamic rather than static representations the schema invoked is a complex schema in which \text{TR} moves along a path of motion into the container \text{LM} as depicted in figure 7.
This schema provides the conceptual form underlying the lexical item 'enter' (Langacker 2008: 32-33) as in (12). However, the movement of TR into LM can be construed metaphorically in alternative constructions such as (13) in which the verb, given its subject, serves to indicate motion metaphorically.


[Asylum seekers \( \tau \text{n} \)] are entering [Britain \( \omega \)] at the rate of 80,000 a year and few are deported.

(13) *The Sun*, 30 Nov. 2002

[Asylum-seekers \( \tau \text{n} \)] are flooding into [Britain \( \omega \)] at the rate of one every four minutes, it was revealed yesterday.

Another metaphor in immigration discourse, then, is IMMIGRATION AS MOVING WATER, which also seems to be constitutive of the discourse (see Charteris-black 2006b; El Refaie 2001; Santa Ana 2002; Hart in press).

The metaphor triggers a number of ideological inferences and argumentation schemes in which immigration is imagined to possess some of the characteristics of moving water (El Refaie 2001: 360). For example, since ‘water’ is a mass noun, the moving objects, immigrants, are construed as a single moving mass thereby masking individual identities, histories, motives and intentions. Similarly, immigration is construed as something which will continue unless otherwise abated and which, if allowed to continue, especially in large quantities, will cause some damage to the ‘container’. In particular, it is construed that continued ‘expansion’ within the ‘container’, given its limited capacity, could cause it to ‘rupture’ as in (14):

(14) *The Observer*, 8 Dec. 2002

[Britain \( \omega \)] is full to bursting point. The Government's own figures show that the UK has the highest levels of immigration in its history: in the last three years, [over half a million \( \tau \text{n} \)] was added to the UK population, and the expansion shows no signs of slowing.

The IMMIGRATION AS MOVING WATER metaphor, then, in conjunction with the COUNTRY AS CONTAINER metaphor, may function as a topos of danger which again calls for a restrictive immigration policy. Within the metaphor, implementing such a policy is construed as ‘closing up’ the ‘container’:

(15) *The Observer*, 1 Oct. 2006

What is needed now is a proper tightening up of our porous borders.

Ideologically, it is crucial to recognise that text-producers have open to them any number of possibilities in choosing the domain to structure new experience and the choice of one domain over another construes the new metaphorised experience in fundamentally different ways with different sets of inferences being made available. As Santa Ana (2002: 72) puts it, ‘to characterise the movement of people as moving water might seem quite natural, but such a formulation of movement of people is not the only possible image that can be employed’. The systematic use of metaphor therefore constrains experience by opening up some possible ways of understanding phenomena whilst closing down others.
3.6 Deixis

Deixis has been widely studied in pragmatics (e.g. Levinson 1983). Here, however, we focus on deixis as a construal operation. Deixis concerns the ‘situatedness’ of discourse and the ‘positioning’ of actors and events on the discourse stage, relative to the speaker, their values, and other ‘situational coordinates’ here and now. Actors and events can be positioned at different ‘distances’ from the speaker along social, spatial and temporal dimensions (cf. Chilton 2004). For example, deictic expressions (e.g. personal pronouns and possessive determiners) can be used, on the one hand, to position addressees at the same situational coordinates as the speaker. That is, in the same broad space, time and social category as the speaker as well as sharing the same set of social values. At the same time, deictic expressions position other actors in separate social categories to the speaker, at spatial and value-oriented coordinates not shared by the speaker, and thus establish relations of distance and difference between in-groups and out-groups. Consider (16) for example.

(16) **Independent on Sunday**, 9 Dec. 2001

(The Home Secretary says: "We have norms of acceptability and [those TR] who come into [our home LM] - for that is what it is - should accept those norms."

A further relevant feature of deixis concerns the ‘vantage point’ of the conceptualiser. That is, the position from which the conceptualiser views the scene cognised. For example, the CONTAINER schema discussed above affords two alternative vantage points. The same scene can be construed from either interior to the container or exterior to it as represented in the two available image schemas in figure 8.

![Figure 8](image)

In immigration discourse, of course, the default construal locates the conceptualiser interior to LM. That is, we tend to construe the situation from the perspective of ‘the “us” who are already in the container, rather than the “them” who have just entered it’ (Charteris-Black 2006b: 577). This vantage point is manifestly indexed in text by deictic verbs like ‘come’ as in (16) and ‘arrive’, alongside proximal demonstrative ‘this’, as in (17).

(17) **Daily Telegraph**, 26 Jan. 2001

Britain is now the destination of choice for asylum seekers. The statistics published yesterday reveal that [almost 100,000 of them TR] arrived in [this country LM] last year alone.

A vantage-point interior perspective has the effect of construing movement of TR into LM as directly consequential for the conceptualiser. This is especially the case when TR is construed, though deixis and (metaphorical) predication, as somehow different or dangerous
to the Self. Coupled with general negative-Other presentation (van Dijk 1995a/b), then, the deictic construal depicted in figure 8a realises what is described by Cap (2006, 2008) as a ‘proximization’ strategy in political discourse aimed at legitimization. Cap (this volume) defines proximization as ‘a pragmatic-cognitive strategy whereby the speaker presents the events on the discourse stage as directly affecting the addressee, in negative and threatening ways’.

Proximization is operationalised on three fronts: space, time and axiology. In axiological proximization (see chapter 5), actors predicated as having a different set of social values as in (16) are construed as moving toward the conceptualiser thus leading to a clash of ideologies. In spatial proximization, actors, events and abstract entities predicated as physically endangering to the conceptualiser are construed as moving toward them and thus leading to possible corporal harm. Consider the following example:

(18) The Express, 22 Aug. 2005

Mr Hague said: “It must now be obvious to all concerned that some of our asylum and human rights laws are being massively abused, something that is not only wrong in principle but is bringing [actual danger \(\text{\textsuperscript{[\text{act}]}}\)] to the people of [Britain \(\text{\textsuperscript{[\text{Brit}]}}\)].

In temporal proximization, the events leading to an ideological clash or corporal harm are construed as ‘close’ to now in the present, recent past or immediate future, indexed in text by tense and aspect, as well as adverbial phrases, and as therefore requiring immediate counter action. Proximization, then, may trigger a topos which can be formulated as follows: if an action or processes directly affects the Self in an adverse way, then it should be redressed with immediate effect. Proximization may also serve to heighten anxiety and stimulate adrenaline (Chilton 2004: 153).

3.8 Epistemic Modality

It has been suggested in Cognitive Linguistics that expressions of epistemic modality involve a deictic construal operation in which propositions are conceptualised as located at different points on a reality-irreality scale in a metaphorical model of ‘epistemic distance’ (Langacker 1991; Werth 1999). After Langacker (1991: 242), the image schema involved can be represented as in figure 9.
In this dynamic model, reality (specifically, reality as entertained by the conceptualiser) is ever-evolving and thus what constitutes ‘known reality’ is always increasing in complexity. The cylinder depicting known reality in figure 9 should therefore be imagined as ‘growing’ along the axis indicated by the arrow (Langacker 1991: 242-43). Known reality, then, is the collective state of affairs accepted by the conceptualiser as real. ‘Irreality’ is everything else. The states of affairs most likely to be accepted as real are those to which the conceptualiser (C) has perceptual access at the time of the discourse event. That is, states of affairs within ‘immediate reality’ (or situational context). In political discourse, of course, text-consumers rarely have perceptual access to the situations and events at issue and must rely instead on what gets reported as real in text. Epistemic modality is therefore a particularly important device in all political discourse, including immigration discourse. Representations only get reproduced and retained in memory as ideologies when they are accepted by text-consumers as real (Chilton 2004; Hart in press). The modal system enables text-producers to signal their own conception of what is accepted as real and, based on the perceived legitimacy of the speaker (Chilton 2004), which is itself constructed through modality, encourages text-consumers to adopt the same conception.

In this epistemic deictic construal operation, then, propositions get situated at more or less distal points relative to what the conceptualiser takes as known reality. This construal operation is indexed in text in various modal markers, including most obviously modal verbs. In English, of course, total epistemic commitment is zero-marked, except in the future tense expressed by will, and the presence of any modal serves to signal some degree of doubt (or deliberate hedging) on the speaker’s part. That is, ‘the zero option indicates that the speaker accepts the designated process as part of known reality, whereas as a modal specifically places it in the realm of irreality’ (Langacker 1991: 245). In media discourse, according to Fairclough, ‘reported happenings are generally presented as categorical truths’ (1989: 107). Thus, in (19), for example, the proposition is encoded as part of known reality, in contrast to the hypothetical example in (20) where the proposition is located in irreality. Of course, there may be strategic reasons for choosing a modalized expression. For example, to avoid accountability for the truth of the assertion whilst still suggesting the idea.


*At least 600,000 eastern Europeans [Ø] have entered Britain in the past two years.*

(20) At least 600,000 eastern Europeans **may** have entered Britain in the past two years.

4. Toward a Typology of Construal Operations

Discursive strategies of the kind identified in CDA – intentional or institutionalised plans of practices, including discourse practices, responsible for the reproduction of ideology (Reisigl and Wodak 2001) – must involve both linguistic and conceptual dimensions. Van Dijk has for a long time recognised that ideology exists in the ‘system of mental representations and processes of group members’ (1995a: 18). Any complete and cogent discussion of the communication of ideology therefore requires an account of the relationship between text and conceptual structure. Discursive strategies are manifested in text but can only be effected in the minds of text-consumers. Construal operations are the conceptual processes through which these discursive strategies are realised, giving rise to ideological cognitive
Christopher Hart

representations. Enabled by general cognitive abilities attention, comparison and perspective, then, construal operations are indexed in text and invited in text-consumers to bring discursive strategies into effect.

Various typologies of discursive strategies have been proposed (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Chilton and Schäffner 1997; Chilton 2004). In the typology below, the various construal operations we have discussed in this chapter are presented in relation to three general discursive strategies in which they function as well as the general cognitive abilities of which they are instantiations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Attention</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Profiling/backgrounding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metonymy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scalar Adjustment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification/Framing</td>
<td>Categorization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positioning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deixis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Epistemic Modality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

The strategy of identification concerns which social actors are represented (explicitly or implicitly), in which roles, and to what degree of salience. Profiling/backgrounding and metonymy can both be used to de-focus certain social actors, usually those identified implicitly as agents. Similarly, categorization (including metonymic categorization and scalar adjustments) can be used to identify a certain set of social actors as the subject of a predication. All of these processes involve our ability to shift attention. Framing concerns how entities, actions, and processes etc., through categorization and metaphor, are predicated with more or less positive or deprecatory qualities. For example, at the most basic level the process of immigration can be framed in different ways, often via metaphor and reflected in the choice of verb (or nominalization) to designate the process. Similarly, the same entities or actors can be framed as different ‘kinds’ with different sets of entailments or associated scripts. Prepositions, for example, impose upon the landmark a particular configuration. Framing and identification are intertwined such that whenever there is explicit identification the choice of referring expression necessarily frames the actor in some particular way by evoking associated evaluative scripts. Framing relies on our general cognitive ability to compare experience. Positioning, which relies on our general cognitive ability for perspective or situatedness in spatial as well as non-spatial domains, concerns where entities and events on the discourse stage, including the discourse participants, are
situated in relation to one another and where the speaker locates the communicated proposition in relation to their own conception of reality.\footnote{10}

5. Conclusion

Cognitive Linguistics presents a useful theoretical framework for CDA. Whilst Cognitive Linguistics has been successfully applied in critical metaphor research, in this chapter I have sought to show how it can be incorporated in critical discourse research beyond metaphor. Cognitive Linguistics offers important theoretical insights into the communication of ideology situated at the interpretation stage and, where metaphor is just one of many construal operations identified in Cognitive Linguistics which may be ideologically significant, it can add to the inventory of analytical categories addressed in CDA. Several such construal operations have been described and presented in relation to three particular discursive strategies.

\footnote{1}{An important exception to this is the work of Paul Chilton (1985, 1987, 1988).}
\footnote{2}{This does not extend to the socio-cognitive approach developed by van Dijk where pragmatics and argumentation theory provide frameworks for analysis (refs).}
\footnote{3}{The notion of construal in Cognitive Linguistics is clearly consistent with the view in CDA that linguistic representation in text is ‘always representation from some ideological point of view, as managed through the inevitable structuring force of transitivity and lexical categorization’ (Fowler 1991: 85).}
\footnote{4}{Image schemas (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Mandler 2004; Hampe and Grady 2005) are conceptual representations of the common skeletal structures which similar situations, events, objects, entities, actions and processes can be ‘boiled down’ to. They are formed initially on the basis of repeated patterns of interaction and are subsequently called upon in conceptualisation. It should be noted that diagrams such as figure 1 are not intended to be identified as image schemas per se, which are patterns of neural activity, but are intended only to evoke them or suggest their nature (see Langacker 2008: 32).}
\footnote{5}{The scope of attention is the conceptual array that immediately surrounds the initial focus of attention and which is directly accessible from it. It stands as the base against which the profiled structure makes sense (Langacker 2008).}
\footnote{6}{Frames, schemas and conceptual metaphors are also idealised cognitive models.}
\footnote{7}{See Hart (in press) for a much more comprehensive analysis of metaphors in immigration discourse, including of the actual blending processes involved.}
\footnote{8}{In using the terms ‘landmark’ (LM) and ‘trajector’ (TR) we are following Langacker’s framework for Cognitive Grammar (1987, 1991). TR is the entity whose circumstance is at issue. It is the entity whose location or motion is described. LM is the entity in relation to which a TR’s location or motion is described. TRs are typically smaller and more mobile than LMs.}
\footnote{9}{Topoi are content-related ‘warrants’ in which a given premise (explicit or implied) presupposes a particular conclusion. They can be expressed as conditional ‘conclusion rules’. See Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Wodak (2001) for a detailed treatment of topoi.}
\footnote{10}{Positioning would also include the subjective processes, including deontic modality, variously catalogued under the banners of ‘stance’, ‘evaluation’ and ‘appraisal’ (Biber and Finegan 1989; Hunston and Thompson 2000; Martin and White 2007).}
References


Moving beyond Metaphor in the Cognitive Linguistic Approach to CDA


