1. Introduction

In this chapter, I focus on discourse, understood as language in practice. I focus specifically on language in social and political practices to show how discourse can, through the patterns of conceptualisation it invokes, function ideologically. In doing so, I survey the most recent developments at the intersection between Cognitive Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis. This synergy represents both a ‘social’, or more specifically a ‘critical’, turn in Cognitive Linguistics as well as a ‘cognitive’ turn in Critical Discourse Analysis, which has traditionally adopted more social science based methodologies. One site where these two perspectives have most successfully and most visibly converged is in the critical study of metaphor, which now constitutes one of the most productive and pervasive methodological approaches to ideological discourse research. More recently, however, the utility of combining Cognitive Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis has been expounded in relation to a wider range of linguistic and conceptual phenomena. In this chapter, then, I only very briefly touch up on critical metaphor studies and concentrate instead on some of the other ways in which Cognitive Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis can be usefully combined to shed light on the ideological properties of texts and conceptualisation. Rather than chronologically chart the development of this field, however, I offer an overview of the landscape from a contemporary vantage point which brings together several analytical strands inside a single, integrated framework.


Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a text-analytical tradition which studies the way language use encodes and enacts ideologies leading to social power abuse, dominance and inequality
Grounded in post-structuralist discourse analysis and Critical Theory, it comes with its own conceptualisation of the relationship between language and society in which language use, discourse, is seen as “socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). That is, discourse exists in a dialectic with social situations and relations, both reflecting and reinforcing social structures. From a socio-cognitive rather than purely post-structuralist perspective, Van Dijk has argued that any cogent account of the relationship between discourse and social structure requires an explanation which first and foremost connects structures in text and talk with structures in the mind (e.g. 1998). The ideologies which support social action, he argues, consist in the socially shared “system of mental representations and processes of group members” (1995: 18). To study the social action effects of language use, then, entails looking at the cognitive or conceptual effects of text and talk in social, economic and political contexts.

Cognitive Linguistics, of course, comes with its own explicitly theorised account of the relationship between language and conceptualisation (Langacker 1987, 1991; Talmy 2000). The incorporation of Cognitive Linguistics in CDA is therefore well motivated: Cognitive Linguistics offers CDA the ‘missing link’ (cf. Chilton 2005) it needs to explain the relationship between discursive and social practices. At the same time, CDA offers Cognitive Linguistics the opportunity to extend its analyses beyond linguistic and conceptual structure to include the constraints that these place on societal structure. This triangular relation is something which has always been alluded to in Cognitive Linguistics, as when, for example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 156) stated that “metaphors create realities for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action, such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor”. The body of work converging on a cognitive approach to language and ideology can therefore be seen to come from both cognitive linguists applying their theories in critical contexts and critical discourse analysts turning to Cognitive Linguistics for new methodologies. Such work in the space between the two disciplines can, according to Dirven et al. (2003: 2), be seen as an invitation to CDA scholars not yet familiar with the tenets and analytic tools that Cognitive Linguistics has to offer to find out more about them as well as an invitation to cognitive linguists to look beyond the traditional areas of language structure to study the social belief and value systems (ideologies) that linguistic structures serve to maintain and perpetuate.

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1 The mutual benefits that collaboration between CL and CDA brings and the extent to which they are compatible has been addressed in several works (including Dirven et al. 2007; Hart 2010, 2011b; Hart and Lukeš 2007; Koller 2014; Nuñez-Perucha 2011; Stockwell 1999).
2 It is unfortunate that a significant body of the American cognitive linguistic work on ideology (e.g. Lakoff 1996) does not pay heed to the more European and Australian work in CDA or European ‘critical’ social theorists like Bakhtin, Bourdieu, Foucault and Habermas who present detailed treatments of the instrumentality of language within the social structure.
3 The synergy between CL and CDA, then, which focuses more on functional variation in text and talk, is entirely in line with, and may be regarded as being part of, the movement toward a broader Cognitive Sociolinguistics (Dirven 2005; Kristiansen and Dirven 2008).
The principle aim of CDA is to bring to the surface for inspection the otherwise clandestine ideological properties of text and talk and in so doing to correct a widespread underestimation of the influence of language in shaping thought and action (Fairclough 1989; Fowler 1991: 89). The claim in CDA is that representation in discourse is “always representation from some ideological point of view” (Fowler 1991: 85). Such perspectivised representations, however, may have become normalised within a given Discourse so that they are no longer recognised as ideological but are rather taken for granted as commonsensical. Thus, language is seen, in line with Systemic Functional Linguistics, not only as “a resource for reflecting on the world” (Halliday and Matthiessen 1999: 7) but as a refracting force which “lends structure to ... experience and helps determine ... way[s] of looking at things” (Halliday 1973: 106).

This relativist position, of course, is also assumed in Cognitive Semantics which, in opposition to structuralist and generativist semantics, has shown that the cognitive models, in the form of categories, frames and conceptual metaphors, which underpin lexical relations, coherence and metaphor in language, are subjective and culturally specific (Lakoff 1987). Like CDA, then, Cognitive Linguistics has revealed that the knowledge structures we take for granted as corresponding with reality in fact mediate and organise reality for us in ways which accord with our language habits. This is most clear in the case of metaphor. One of the fundamental findings of Cognitive Linguistics has been the extent to which complex and abstract knowledge domains are structured, metaphorically, by more basic, familiar domains of experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Gibbs, this volume). Ontological correspondences in the source domain get mapped on to elements in the target domain to provide it with internal structure. This input, in turn, provides the basis for reason and inference within the target domain. These conceptual metaphors are evidenced by the systematic way that they are reflected in metaphorical expressions. Toward the more conventional end of the cline from novel to conventional metaphor, however, language users are not aware that they are producing or processing metaphor. Crucially, therefore, the ‘logic’ in the target domain is not consciously experienced as derived and therefore mediated but is taken for granted as absolutely, objectively reflecting reality. There are obvious parallels here between conceptual metaphors and other forms of representation normalised inside a Discourse (see Hart 2010). More recently, experimental research on cross-linguistic differences has confirmed the effects of language on cognition in both basic and metaphorised domains of experience (Levinson 2003; Boroditsky 2001; see also Wolff 2001).

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4 Discourse in this more abstract sense is understood as a “regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (Foucault 1972: 80), including their lexical, grammatical, phonological, pragmatic and multimodal forms, within a given domain/genre. Discourses in this Foucauldian sense conceal ideology by “making what is social seem natural” (Kress 1989: 10). Following Gee (1990) we may use ‘(d)iscourse’ to refer to language in use and ‘(D)iscourse’ to refer to social practices that license and are licensed by language in use.

5 As Shimko (2004: 657) states, “certain metaphors are so taken for granted that they usually slip into our thoughts and actions undetected and unrecognised”.
and Holmes, this volume). The relativist argument is pursued in CDA, however, along the following lines: “differences of linguistic structure in the same variety of English (such as in different news reports) can cause readers to see the world being described in different ways” (O’Halloran 2003: 15). Metaphor is of particular significance here as alternative source domains are available to construe the same target domain in alternative terms, leading to different emotional reactions and ‘logical’ conclusions. In so far as “ideology is made possible by the choices a language allows for representing the same material situation in different ways” (Haynes 1989: 119), then, metaphor in discourse is inherently ideological. Consider a brief example:

(1) [A] largely peaceful demonstration spilled over into bloody violence in the centre of London … Clashes later erupted at Mansion House Street and Queen Victoria Street near the Bank. (Telegraph, 1 April 2009)

(2) The G20 protests in central London turned violent today ahead of tomorrow’s summit, with a band of demonstrators close to the Bank of England storming a Royal Bank of Scotland branch, and baton-wielding police charging a sit-down protest by students. (Guardian, 1 April 2009)

The contrast between (1) and (2) lies in the competing source domains recruited to conceptualise the same violent situation. In (1), the source domain is that of a volcano. The image invoked is of a potentially dangerous liquid previously contained ‘boiling up’ and escaping from the container. Such a conceptualisation suggests the need to control the liquid which in the target domain equates to the controversial crowd control technique known, presumably by no coincidence, as ‘kettling’. The construal invoked by (1) thus seems to disempower the protesters, reducing their actions to natural phenomena and thus removing their agency, whilst at the same time sanctioning police practices. The source domain in (2), by contrast, is that of war. According to Semino (2008: 100), war metaphors in political discourse “tend to dramatize the opposition between different participants … who are constructed as enemies”. Crucially, however, the use of such militarising metaphors in relation to both sides serves to empower protesters presenting their actions as ‘fighting’ for some cause. The use of ‘storm’ in particular seems to have positive connotations of purpose and precision.

Of equal importance, however, is the relation conceived in Cognitive Linguistics between grammar and conceptualisation where, as Langacker puts it, “it is precisely because of their conceptual import – the contrasting images they impose – that alternative grammatical

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6 Ideology in discourse is defined most broadly here as “a systematically organised presentation of reality” (Hodge and Kress 1993: 15). In the Socio-Cognitive Approach to CDA, Van Dijk (e.g. 1998) has attempted to articulate at a finer level of detail the properties of ideologies. Most basically, for Van Dijk, ideologies involve an Us/Them polarisation and, typically, positive beliefs about and attitudes toward Us and negative beliefs about and attitudes toward Them. For a further, more detailed, discussion of the contents, structure and format of ideologies from a Cognitive Linguistics perspective see Koller (2014).
devices are commonly available to code the same situation” (1991: 295). Grammar, on this account, is inherently meaningful. Grammatical constructions impose a particular construal on the scene described. They guide attention along particular parameters where, analogous with visual processing, “what we actually see depends on how closely we examine it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most attention to, and where we view it from” (Langacker 2008: 55). Alongside what it has been able to reveal about semantic metaphor in discourse, then, another important contribution of Cognitive Linguistics in CDA has been to theorise in cognitively plausible terms the conceptual weight of grammatical metaphor (in the form of agentless passivisation and nominalisation), which, in specific discursive contexts, is also said to be ideologically load-bearing (Hart 2011b).

If linguistic (semantic or grammatical) structures have the facility, in specific contexts, to reproduce ideology, then language is not only an important instrument of power but, from a critical analytical perspective, it’s operationalisation in discourse is an important window on the ideologies of powerful speakers and the discourse communities over whom they have influence. It is in this sense that Cognitive Linguistics “offers analytic tools for the critical assessment of ideologies” (Dirven et al. 2007: 1236). It is a central tenet of Cognitive Linguistics that language reflects conceptual structures and processes, which are in turn grounded in more general cognitive abilities (Croft and Cruse 2004). And since “any ideology is a conceptual system of a particular kind” (Lakoff 1996: 37), it follows that language use affords access to ideologies. Linguistic analysis, and Cognitive Linguistic analysis in particular, is therefore an important tool in ideological research. Cognitive Linguistics addresses “the structuring within language of such basic conceptual categories as those of space and time, scenes and events, entities and processes, motion and location, and force and causation” (Talmy 2000: 3) – precisely the kind of transitivity phenomena that critical discourse analysts have been interested in. Cognitive Linguistics, then, is especially useful for CDA in so far as it can “lay bare the structuring of concepts and conceptions” (Dirven et al. 2003: 4) which constitute ideologies. Cognitive Linguistics, in other words, can serve as an analytical lens through which the latent ideologies expressed in, and enacted through, discourse can be brought to critical consciousness.

In the following sections, we review some of the ways in which Cognitive Linguistics and CDA can be usefully combined in ideological discourse research.

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7 On this account, ideology is seen as “a system of beliefs and values based on a set of cognitive models” (Dirven et al. 2003: 1) and may thus be analysed in terms of categories, frames, conceptual metaphors and image schemas as well as the ‘online’ conceptualisations which may become idealised in more stable ‘offline’ conceptual structures (Hart 2010).
3. The Cognitive Linguistic Approach to CDA

Unsurprisingly given its centrality in the development of Cognitive Linguistics, the earliest and most influential combination of Cognitive Linguistics and CDA is in the guise of Critical Metaphor Analysis utilising Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Chilton 1996; Santa Ana 2002; Wolf and Polzenhagen 2003; Musolff 2003, 2004; Charteris-Black 2004, 2006; Koller 2004, 2005; Maalej 2007; Goatly 2007). As readers of this handbook will know, however, there is much more to the Cognitive Linguistics bow than metaphor theory. Cognitive Linguistics offers a number of theories which have in common a specific set of assumptions including that linguistic (semantic and grammatical) structures are based on the same general cognitive abilities as other domains of cognition, that linguistic knowledge is conceptual in nature, that meaning is grounded in experience, and that words and constructions both construe experience. These theories address a range of linguistic/conceptual phenomena, including categorisation, schematisation, metaphor, salience, selection and perspectivisation (see relevant chapters in this volume), all of which can be seen, in certain discursive contexts, to function ideologically. The broader synergy between Cognitive Linguistics and CDA aims to account for the reproduction of ideology in discourse in terms of these conceptual operations. This synergy thus offers an explanatory framework in which the ideological dimensions of language are related to general conceptual principles (Dirven et al. 2007: 1236). Indeed, it is a particular strength of the Cognitive Linguistic Approach to CDA that a wide array of ideological phenomena in discourse, which may appear to be diverse, can be accounted for against a common theoretical backdrop (ibid.). Whilst metaphor studies have dominated Cognitive Linguistic investigations of ideology in CDA, then, other theories in Cognitive Linguistics have been applied, including prototype theory (O’Halloran 2003), force-dynamics (Hart 2011a) and various aspects of Cognitive Grammar (Marín Arrese 2011a; Hart 2013). Cognitively motivated theories of linguistic description and conceptual modelling have also been developed to account for ideology in longer stretches of discourse, most notably Chilton’s (2004) Discourse Space Theory.

Based on Croft and Cruse’s (2004) classification of construal operations, Hart (2011b, 2013a/b) offers a taxonomy which attempts to locate these analytical strands inside a single coherent framework. Here, construal operations are classified as instantiations of four general cognitive systems: Gestalt, Comparison, Attention, and Perspective. Similarly, the ideological functions of these construal operations can be analysed in terms of their

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8 It should be noted that various labels and classifications have been applied to these ‘construal operations’ (cf. Croft and Cruse 2004; Verhagen 2010)
9 This is not to say that all authors in this field would necessarily situate their work with respect to this taxonomy or the broader Cognitive Linguistic Approach envisaged here.
10 See Langacker (this volume) for an alternative classification.
realisation of four ‘discursive strategies’: Structural configuration, framing, identification, and positioning (see Figure 1). Discursive strategies are understood here, following Reisigl and Wodak (2001), as more or less intentional/institutionalised plans of practices whose realisation achieves particular cognitive, emotive and/or social action effects. Realisation, in its cognitive dimension, is understood as constituting hearers’ conceptions of the situations/events described. Construal operations invoked in the hearer are the site of this realisation and thus ideological reproduction.

11 For alternative taxonomies of discursive strategies see Reisigl and Wodak (2001); Chilton and Schäffner (1997); Chilton (2004).
12 I stop short of suggesting that discursive strategies force particular conceptualisations and inferences on the grounds that speakers are never in total control of hearer’s cognitive processes. However, they can construct contexts and guide interpretation in such a way that certain conceptualisations and inferences are at least likely to be entertained. The extent to which audiences are manipulated by language is a fundamental issue to CDA which has recently been revisited in light of developments in Cognitive Science (see Chilton 2005, 2011; Hart 2010, 2011c, 2013c; O’Halloran 2011; Oswald 2011; Maillat and Oswald 2011; Marin Arrese 2011b; de Saussure 2011).

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<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Gestalt</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Attention</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
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Figure 1. Construal operations and discursive strategies

In Figure 1, structural configuration strategies are realised through schematisation and involve the imposition of a particular image-schematic representation which constitutes our most basic understanding of the object- or event-structure. Schematisation is based in the Gestalt system which enables conceptualisers to analyse complex scenes as holistic
structures. Framing strategies concern the attribution of particular qualities to entities, actors, actions, relations and processes as alternative categories and metaphors are apprehended in their conceptualisation.\textsuperscript{13} Identification strategies concern the salience with which social actors are represented in the conceptualisation and are realised through a number of construal operations including profiling, scanning and scalar adjustment. These construal operations are grounded in the system of attention. Positioning strategies can be spatial, temporal or modal. They relate to where, in space or time, we view a scene from and where we locate elements in the discourse relative to that ‘anchorage point’. Modal positioning relates to where we locate propositions in the discourse relative to our own conceptions of reality (epistemic) and morality (deontic).\textsuperscript{14} Positioning strategies are grounded in our ability to conceive of a scene from different perspectives. They are realised in point of view and deixis.

The ideological functions of these construal operations have been analysed across a range of specific contexts including, \textit{inter alia}, immigration (El Refaie 2001; Santa Ana 2002; Charteris-Black 2006; Hart 2010), urban planning (Todoli), business (Koller 2004), European politics (Musolff 2004; Sing 2011; Nasti 2012); war (Chilton 1996, 2004; Maalej 2007; Marín Arrese 2011a), and political protests (Hart 2013a/b). In what follows, I try to demonstrate how Cognitive Linguistic analyses of some of these conceptual parameters allow a handle on the ideological properties of text and talk. Sections are organised around the discursive strategies given in Figure 1. I leave out framing strategies realised in categorisation and metaphor due to limits on space and the availability of a now significant body of research in this area (see references herein). I illustrate these strategies and construal operations with data from across various social and political Discourses and genres.

4. Conceptual Parameters for Ideology

4.1 Structural Configuration (Gestalt)

Structural configuration is a strategy by means of which speakers impose on the scene a particular image-schematic representation which constitutes our most basic understanding of the topological and relational structure of the complex under conception. Grounded in the Gestalt system, it relies on our ability to analyse multifaceted entities and events in terms of particular, holistic structures – image schemas. Image schemas are abstract Gestalt structures many of which emerge pre-linguistically from repeated patterns in embodied experience (Johnson 1987; Mandler 2004). They later come to form the meaningful basis of

\textsuperscript{13} It should be noted that whilst structural configuration and framing strategies can be separated for purposes of analysis they are rarely, if ever, separable in the practice of discourse. For example, categorization and metaphor may involve the imposition of particular schemas.

\textsuperscript{14} I would also be inclined to consider evaluations in the system of Appraisal as described by Martin and White (2005) as construal operations realising positioning strategies.
many lexical concepts as well as grammatical constructions and are thus invoked in discourse to construe experience in particular ways.

Various image schemas have been identified in Cognitive Linguistics. These can be catalogued in various ways (see, for example, Evans and Green 2006: 190). However, let us here mention four broad domains of image schemata: Space, Motion, Force, and Action. Space schemas include a container schema, a verticality schema, a near-far schema, and a contact schema. Motion schemas include a source-path-goal schema and a momentum schema. Force schemas incorporate the various force-dynamic schemas which, as described by Talmy (2000), constitute concepts of causation and letting. Finally, action schemas would include the canonical action-chain as described by Langacker (1991, 2002) as well as ‘transformations’ of that schema. In structural configuration strategies, speakers select from the set of available schemas to construe entities and events as being of a particular type and internal structure. Schematisation is ideological, then, because image schemas “constrain and limit meaning as well as patterns of inference in our reasoning” (ibid. p.42). And, since different schemas have different topological and relational properties, giving rise to different entailments – defined as functional “implications of the internal structure of image schemata” (Johnson 1987: 22) – their particular selection in discourse may achieve different ideological effects.

Hart (2011a) has shown how immigration discourse makes use of force-dynamic schemas to construe the physical, political and legal dimensions of immigration. Consider the contrast between (3) and (4).

(3) It's estimated that between 1,000 and 1,200 asylum seekers are coming into the country every month. (The Mirror, 10.05.2002)

(4) Downing Street acknowledge that illegal immigration was an issue because of growing frustrations over the stream of people getting into Britain from France through the Channel tunnel. (Daily Telegraph, 21.05.2000)

In (3), the speaker selects a motion schema to construe the physical process of migration. This schema consists of a Trajector (TR) (immigrants) moving along a path of motion into a Landmark (LM) (Britain). By contrast, (4), as a function of the lexical semantics for ‘getting’ in this context, encodes a force-dynamic construal. Here, immigrants are cast in the role of an agonist (AGO), defined in Talmy’s terminology like a Trajector as an entity whose circumstance or location is at issue. However, there is a second active participant, an antagonist (ANT), defined as an entity whose relation with the agonist determines its circumstance or location. The antagonist can be construed as engaging with the agonist in various force-dynamic relations, including impingement as in (4). Here the antagonist is left implicit but can be read as physical barriers to immigration. The two alternative schemas invoked by (3) and (4) can be modelled as in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. The arrow in Figure 2 designates ‘free’ motion. In Figure 3, by contrast, it represents the resultant of a force-interaction between two entities in which the antagonist attempts to restrict the
movement of the AGONIST but, as the stronger entity (+), the AGONIST is able to overcome or avoid the constraints placed upon it.

Schematising the movement of people in force-dynamic terms constructs a binary opposition in which ANT and AGO are pitted against one another and thus contributes to an Us versus Them ideological structure. There is then a further ideological dimension in which particular role participants are cast (Wolf and Polzenhagen 2003: 265). Casting immigrants in the role of AGONIST with an intrinsic tendency toward action as in (4) depicts them as instigators of force interactions. The ANTAGONIST, on the other hand, is seen as simply maintaining the status quo. More rhetorically, a force-dynamic construal seems to presuppose that immigration ought to be prevented and that in overcoming or avoiding the impinging force of the ANTAGONIST immigrants are acting wrongfully.

Hart (2013a/b) has similarly shown the ideological effects of schematisation in media representations of political protests. Here he shows that the ‘cognitive discourse grammar’ for representing interactions between police and protestors provides recourse to ACTION, FORCE or MOTION schemas. Ideologically, these schemas mitigate the role of participants in the events described to differing degrees. Consider, for example, the contrast between (5) and (6).

(5) A number of police officers were injured after they came under attack from youths, some wearing scarves to hide their faces. (Times, 10.11.2010)
(6) Activists who had masked their faces with scarves traded punches with police. (Guardian, 10.11.2010)

In (5), at a discourse level, the interaction between participants is construed in terms of a canonical action chain in which there is a transfer of energy from an AGENT (A) ‘upstream’ in the energy flow to a PATIENT (P) ‘downstream’ in the energy flow. As with force-dynamic construals, there is an ideological dimension to the roles that participants are assigned. In a case study of online press reports of the UK Student Fees protests in 2010, Hart (2013b) found that protestors were significantly more likely to be represented as agents in a canonical action chain and police as patients than the other way around. When police were
construed as agentive in an ACTION event, it was found, this was more likely to be in a RECIPROCAL rather than the canonical ASYMMETRICAL action chain (ibid.). The alternative construals invoked by (5) and (6) can be modelled as in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. The arrow in Figure 4 indicates the transfer of energy from an AGENT (the source of the energy flow) to a PATIENT (the target of the energy flow). In Figure 5, however, the energy flow is bidirectional. Each participant is both a source and a target and so both are assigned agency. Ideologically, construing interactions between police and protestors in terms of a reciprocal action chain serves to mutually apportion responsibility for the violent encounter. Thus, when police are attributed agency in violent interactions their part is mitigated as a consequence of shared accountability.

![Figure 4. ASYMMETRICAL ACTION schema](image)

![Figure 5. RECIPROCAL ACTION schema](image)

In the same case study, it was further found that police agency was most likely to be construed in terms of FORCE or MOTION schemas, thus further legitimising or mitigating their part in the violence. Consider (7) and (8).

(7) The 20 officers lining the route at Millbank faced an impossible task of trying to hold back thousands of demonstrators (*Daily Mail*, 10.11.2010)
(8) About 50 riot police moved in just after 5pm (*Independent*, 10.11.2010)

In (7), the speaker selects a force-dynamic schema casting police in the role of ANTAGONIST and protestors in the role of AGONIST. Notice, then, that this sets up an oppositional relation in which protestors are seen as being on the wrong side of the law and presented as instigators of force or violence who, if not held back, will ‘take over’. The police, by contrast, are presented in the valiant role of defenders of moral order. The schema invoked by (7) can be modelled as in Figures 6.
In this force-dynamic schema, the **ANTAGONIST** is the stronger entity (+) able to prevent the **AGONIST** from realising its intrinsic force tendency (>) resulting in a state of equilibrium (O). There is no transfer of energy from a source to a target but, rather, what is at stake is the balance of strength between the two participants. Compare this to (9) in which the police are agentive in a RETALIATORY ACTION schema:

(9) Rocks, wooden banners, eggs, rotten fruit and shards of glass were thrown at police officers trying to **beat back** the crowd with metal batons and riot shields. (*Telegraph*, 10.11.2010)

The schema invoked by (8) is the same as modelled in Figure 2. In this context, however, the construal serves euphemistically to present police action in terms of motion. The arrow denotes a path of motion rather than a transfer of energy with its terminus a location (GOAL) rather than a participant (PATIENT). The asymmetry in construal of agency between police and protestors contributes to a Discourse in which the current social order is legitimated and civil action is seen as deviant and therefore delegitimated.

Structural configuration strategies overlap with identification strategies as image schemata invoked in discourse are subject to various kinds of ‘focal adjustment’ within the system of attention. We turn to identification strategies in the following section.

### 4.2 Identification (Attention)

Identification strategies concern the salience of social actors within the conceptual contents invoked by linguistic constructions. There is a significant amount of work in CDA on the ideological potential of particular types of grammatical construction, including agentless passives, which are said to “enable speakers to conjure away responsible, involved or affected actors (whether victims or perpetrators), or to keep them in the semantic background” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 58). In Cognitive Grammar, the conceptual reflex of such grammatical devices and the psychological reality of ‘the semantic background’ are accounted for in terms of profile/base distinctions grounded in the system of attention (Langacker 2002).
It is a fundamental feature of cognition that in perceiving any scene one entity stands out relative to another. Cognitive Linguists (e.g. Talmy 2002; Langacker 2002) recognise this phenomenon in language too. Words and constructions bring to prominence particular facets of a given conceptual structure, such as a frame or schema. In Cognitive Grammar, this construal operation is called ‘profiling’. According to this framework, transactive processes invoke an action schema such as modelled in Figure 7. The straight arrow represents the transfer of energy between participants. The stepped arrow represents the resultant of this interaction on the patient.

![Figure 7. ACTION schema (CHANGE OF STATE)](image)

Depending on the grammatical realisation, however, different constructions, by linguistically encoding particular aspects of the whole event-structure, distribute attention across the model in different ways. A full transactive clause, for example, profiles the whole schema, where the profiled portion of the schema is that stretch downstream of the participant encoded as Subject. This is modelled in Figure 8. An agentless passive construction, by contrast, profiles only that portion of the schema downstream of the patient, leaving the agent in the ‘scope of attention’ but cognitively and experientially backgrounded. As Langacker (2008: 384) puts it, “when one participant is left unspecified, the other becomes more salient just through the absence of competition. On the other hand, augmenting the salience of one participant diminishes that of others (in relative terms)”. Consider the following example.

(10) Seven killed in Afghanistan Koran burning protests [headline]

Seven people were killed today in clashes between Afghan security forces and protesters demonstrating against the burning of Muslim holy books at a NATO military base. (Independent online, 22.02.2012)

In (10), the agents of ‘killing’ are not specified, either in the headline or the body of the article. The agentless passive construction invokes a conceptualisation as modelled in Figure 9. Such a construal, it would be argued in CDA, represents a ‘preferred model’ (Van...

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15 For present purposes, I am glossing over a third possible participant in the event-structure in the form of an INSTRUMENT OF THEME.
Dijk 1998) of the event in which agency in actions that are not consonant with dominant Discourses gets obfuscated (Toolan 1991). In this case, of course, the actions of Afghan security forces might be considered to destabilise the Discourse of democratization which sanctified intervention in Afghanistan.

Nominalisation can serve a similar ideological function in excluding agency from the clause (Fairclough 1989 Fowler 1991;). The conceptual reflex of nominalisation is also grounded in the system of attention. In Cognitive Grammar it is said to involve a particular mode of ‘scanning’. According to Cognitive Grammar we conceptualise events by mentally scanning the series of relations obtaining between participants at different (continuous) stages in the process that constitutes an event. There are two modes of scanning: sequential scanning and summary scanning. In sequential scanning, “the various phases of an evolving situation are examined serially, in noncumulative fashion” (Langacker 2002: 78-79). This is the mode of scanning invoked by a transactive clause where the relationships held between entities at different moments in the evolving event get profiled. However, as Langacker put it, “we nevertheless have the conceptual agility to construe an event by means of summary scanning” (2002: 79). In summary scanning, the various facets of an event are examined cumulatively so that the whole complex comes to cohere as a single gestalt (ibid.). That is, we see an event as an OBJECT or THING rather than as a series of INTERACTIONS and PROCESSES. And since “things do not pertain to time, we do not scan their internal component states sequentially but see all of them accumulated” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 80). Through summary scanning, then, attention to internal event-structure, including participant roles, is occluded. In example (10) above, we see an instance of nominalisation in ‘the burning of Muslim holy books’. The nominalised verb profiles the reification and thus conceptually backgrounds agent-patient relations, again contributing to a preferred model of ideologically ‘awkward’ events. The two modes of scanning are modelled in Figures 10 and 11.
The construal operations we have examined so far are semantically encoded. The final strategy we examine, in the next section, is positioning. Positioning strategies are more pragmatic in nature, directly anchored to the communicative context and more dependent on an intersubjective consensus of values.

4.3 Positioning (Perspective)

Positioning strategies in various (spatial, temporal and modal) guises have been studied from a broadly Cognitive Linguistic perspective (Bednarek 2006; Cap 2006, 2011; Marín Arrese 2011a). Positioning strategies pertain to the ontological relations between elements in a text, as well as epistemological/axiological relations between propositions and the speaker/hearer. They rely on our ability to ‘fix’ conceptions relative to a particular perspective. Literally, this perspective is a VIEWPOINT (Langacker 1987) in space which is operationalised on two dimensions: the vertical or the horizontal. Langacker refers here to VANTAGE POINT and ORIENTATION respectively. The VIEWPOINT can, in turn, be construed at different DISTANCES from the scenes conceived. In Croft and Cruse’s (2004) taxonomy of construal operations, deixis and Langacker’s subjectivity/objectivity distinction are both also seen as instantiations of the PERSPECTIVE system. Grounded in Mental Spaces Theory (Fauconnier 1994) and geometrical approaches to conceptualisation (Gärdenfors 2004), Chilton (2004) proposes an inherently deictic cognitive model of discourse coherence in which spatial representations metaphorically extend to account for social, temporal and modal ‘positioning’. This framework, which Chilton refers to as Discourse Space Theory, has become an increasingly popular approach to conceptually modelling the interpersonal and affective dimensions of political discourse (see, e.g., Cap 2013; Kaal 2012; Filardo Llamas 2013).
Discourse Space Theory is specifically designed to account for the conceptual structures built in ‘discourse beyond the sentence’. The claim is that during discourse hearers open a mental space in which the world described in the discourse is conceptually represented. The mental space, or discourse space, consists of three intersecting axes around which the discourse world is constructed. These axes are a socio-spatial axis (S), a temporal axis (T) and a modal axis (M). Each axis represents a scale of remoteness from a ‘deictic centre’, which corresponds with the deictic reference points for the communicative event. Crucially, for the theory, this extends beyond the spatiotemporal ‘here’ and ‘now’ to include the social group ‘us’ and shared evaluations of what is ‘right’ both cognitively and morally. We can think of each axis as having polar reference points with various intermediate stations. For example, the S axis may be taken to represent an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ polarisation. The T axis represents a time line from ‘now’ to ‘distant future’ and ‘distant past’. And the M axis represents a right-wrong scale.

The construction of discourse worlds involves the ‘plotting’ of discourse elements within the three dimensional space relative to one and other and in relation to the topography of the basic model. The relative coordinates of these elements are indexed in text by linguistic representations and presupposed knowledge/value systems. Hearers are then invited to reconstruct this particular worldview. The basic architecture is seen in Figure 12.

Crucially, the mapping out of elements inside the discourse space does not directly reflect reality but rather constructs it. The representation is thus subject to construal. Discourse elements can be proximised or distanced relative to the deictic centre. This deictic construal operation seems to be based on a CONTRACTION/PROTRACTION image schema. In the discourse space, this involves a shortening or lengthening of the distance between discourse elements and the deictic centre. Thus, as Chilton states, for many English speakers/hearers, Australia might be conceptualised as closer to the deictic centre along the socio-spatial axis than Albania. Evans (2004) shows that TIME too may be conceptualised as contracted or protracted.

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16 In this way, the theory has much in common with Text World Theory (Werth 1999) which is often applied in Cognitive Poetics (see Stockwell, this volume).

17 Note that the diagram is a two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional space.
Cap (2006) presents an elaborated theory of ‘proximisation’ – a rhetorical strategy which works by “alerting the addressee to the proximity or imminence of phenomena which can be a ‘threat’ to the addressee and thus require immediate reaction” (p. 4). Within the taxonomy presented in Figure 1, we can characterise proximisation as a deictic construal operation realising spatio-temporal positioning strategies. To illustrate how all of this works, consider first the following extract from Tony Blair’s (the then British Prime Minister) foreword to the 24th September 2002 dossier outlining the case for war against Iraq:

(11) I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped. Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital to his 3 strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional domination. And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.
I am quite clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, indeed has already done so, to hide these weapons and avoid giving them up. In today’s inter-dependent world, a major regional conflict does not stay confined to the region in question ...

The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam’s, is real. Unless we face up to the threat, not only do we risk undermining the authority of the UN, whose resolutions he defies, but more importantly and in the longer term, we place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own people.

The discourse world constructed by the text is (partially) modelled in Figure 13. Actors and locations are positioned along the S axis at relative distances from deictic centre, dependent on construed social distance. ‘Saddam Hussein’ and his ‘regime’ are constructed as Them and positioned at the extreme end of the S axis. Other participants are positioned between Them and the presupposed Us indexed in the text by ‘we’. The ‘United Nations’ and the ‘International Community’ are construed as ‘closer’ to Us than ‘Iraq’ and the broader ‘region’.

The modal axis is simultaneously engaged in both a deontic and an epistemic capacity. In Figure 13 it is presented in its deontic guise where it stands as a scale of morality/immorality. Elements in the text like ‘brutal and aggressive’, ‘threat’, ‘WMD’ and ‘regional domination’, based on an assumed shared value system, are associated with ‘immorality’ and so positioned at the remote end of M. Elements along the different axes are linked by means of ‘connectors’ which represent various kinds of relation including attribution, possession and intention. The zone around the deictic centre represents the extension of the conceptualiser’s physical, social, moral and temporal ground.

The location of elements along S and M in the discourse space realise distancing positioning strategies. However, we can see both spatial and temporal proximisation where the ‘threat’ posed by ‘Saddam Hussein’ and his ‘WMD’ is construed as (potentially) closer to or entering the conceptualiser’s spatio-temporal ground. This construal operation is denoted in Figure 13 by the ‘vectors’ pointing toward deictic centre along S and T. Spatial proximisation is indexed in the text by predicates which indicate (sometimes indirectly) that the range of the threat may extend to the conceptualiser’s physical ground. These include:

- has **used** chemical weapons, not only **against an enemy state**, but **against his own people**
- does not **stay confined to the region in question**
- place at risk the lives and prosperity of **our own people**
This proximisation, then, is built up in the text progressively as the threat is presented as extending from ‘enemy states’ and ‘his own people’ to the broader ‘region’ and, finally, to ‘our own people’. Interestingly, this conceptual proximisation is also symbolically represented in the information sequence of the unfolding discourse. Temporal proximisation occurs where elements in the text position the reality of this threat as close to ‘now’. Expressions of temporal proximisation include ‘current’ and the now notorious ‘within 45 minutes’.

Figure 13. Spatial and Temporal Proximisation

Operating over the other dimensions, we can identify epistemic proximisation as realising an epistemological positioning strategy (Hart 2014; see also Bednarek 2006). In the discourse space, the modal axis is also always engaged in an epistemic aspect representing a scale of reality/irreality. The discourse world for the text above, this time with the modal axis presented in its epistemic capacity, is shown in Figure 14. The zone around the deictic centre here represents the extension of the conceptualiser’s epistemic ground, that is, what the conceptualiser takes to be ‘known reality’ (Langacker 1991). Epistemic proximisation occurs as propositions embedded in the text, such as ‘Saddam Hussein possesses WMD and poses a threat to the world which may be realised within 45 minutes’, represented in the
discourse space by the connections between elements, are construed as part of known reality. Epistemic proximisation is indexed in text by expressions of epistemic modality and evidentiality, as well as existential presuppositions, which act as metaphorical ‘forces’ (cf. Sweetser 1990; Talmy 2000) on the proposition propelling it toward the conceptualiser’s ‘right’ at the deictic centre. In the text we find examples such as ‘I am in no doubt that’, ‘is real’, ‘intelligence reports make clear that’ and ‘the document discloses that’.

Figure 14. Epistemic Proximisation

One further, final, construal operation worth discussing in relation to modal positioning strategies is subjectivity/objectivity. This construal operation pertains to whether or not the speaker places themselves ‘onstage’ as part of the object of conception (Langacker 1991) and, if so, whether this is alone or accompanied. According to Langacker, the speaker is objectified, made salient, if they are explicitly designated as the source of the predication. They are subjectified when they remain only implicitly the source of the predication. Since in both cases, the speaker rather than some third party is the source of the predication, Langacker’s subjectification and objectification both relate to notions of subjectivity as traditionally dealt with in the literature on stance and evaluation (e.g. Huston and Thompson 2000; Englebretson 2007). Here, speakers may express either a subjective or an
intersubjective stance on a given proposition. In Langacker’s framework, a speaker may thus be subjectively or intersubjectively objectified.

Marín Arrese (2011a) discusses the ideological implications of subjectivity and, cutting across these notions, proposes a four-way classification of ‘epistemic stance-taking acts’ as follows:

- **Subjective Explicit (SE):** the speaker is objectified as the sole evaluator
- **Intersubjective Explicit (IE):** the speaker and some other subject are together objectified as appraisers in agreement
- **Subjective Implicit (SI):** the speaker is subjectified but understood to be the sole evaluator
- **Intersubjective Opaque (IO):** the speaker is not identified as evaluator subjectively or objectively but rather evidence in favour of a particular evaluation is presented as (potentially) mutually accessible.

This ‘grammar’ provides for ideologically motivated choices which depend on whether and to what extent of explicitness the speaker is prepared to claim sole responsibility for the assertion being made as in SE/SI, whether they wish to share in the evaluation either to stand behind an institution (*we the Government*) or to claim common ground with the audience (*we the speaker and addressee*) (IE), or whether the speaker needs to invoke external sources of support (IO). The expressions of epistemic proximisation in the text above are categorised in Marín Arrese’s typology as follows:

- I am in no doubt that; I am clear that (SE)
- is real (SI)
- intelligence reports make clear that; the document discloses that (IO)

(SE) is a marked characteristic of Blair’s rhetorical style (Marin Arrese 2011a). In effect, it asks the audience not just to believe the speaker but to believe in the speaker. It betrays a speaker confident in their own credibility. However, as Van Dijk (2011: 53) states, “speakers are more credible when they are able to attribute their knowledge or opinions to reliable sources, especially if some of the recipients may doubt whether they are well grounded”. In order to convince audiences, therefore, political and media genres often require speakers to advance evidence for their assertions (Chilton 2004; Hart 2011c). Various types of evidence are available (see Bednarek 2006). However, particularly prominent in political discourse is the kind of ‘proof’ invoked by Blair including ‘independent reports’, ‘investigations’, ‘studies’ and ‘statistics’.

9. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to provide an overview of some of the ways in which Cognitive Linguistics and CDA can be combined to reveal ideological properties of text and conceptualisation. In doing so, I have surveyed a number of construal operations which,
invoked by particular linguistic instantiations in discourse, may carry some ideological load. I have further attempted to systematise these inside a single, coherent theoretical framework relating construal operations to the domain-general cognitive systems on which they rely and to the discursive strategies which they potentially realise. Several construal operations have been identified as fulfilling an ideological potential in specific discursive contexts. Those discussed in this chapter should not be taken as an exhaustive set. Nearly all construal operations may be ideologically significant in certain contexts. They are, however, representative of those so far addressed within the body of work existing at the intersection between Cognitive Linguistics and CDA.

References


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